City of Blackfoot v. Spackman Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 44207 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-25-2016
City of Blackfoot v. Spackman Appellant's Reply
Brief Dckt. 44207
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"City of Blackfoot v. Spackman Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 44207" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6444.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6444
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner-Appellant, Supreme Court Docket No. 44207-2016 
V. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Snake River Basin Adjudication 
Case No. CV-2015-1687 
Respondents, 
and 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, BURLEY 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MILER 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, AMERICAN 
FALLS IRRIGATION DISTRICT #2, 
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
NORTH SIDE CANAL COMP ANY, TWIN 
FALLS CANAL COMPANY, 
lntervenors-Respondents. 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261, 
In the name of the City of Blackfoot. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham; 
Honorable Eric J. Wildman, District Judge, Presiding 
Fl PY 
NOV 2 5 2016 
Supreme 
Garrett H. Sandow, ISB # 5215 
220 N. Meridian 
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221 
Telephone: (208) 785-9300 
Facsimile: (208) 785-0595 
Robert L. Harris, ISB #7018 
Luke H. Marchant, ISB #7944 
D. Andrew Rawlings, ISB #9569 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208)523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for the City of Blaclifoot 
John K. Simpson, ISB #4242 
Travis L. Thompson, ISB #6168 
Paul L. Arrington, ISB #7198 
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP 
195 River Vista Place, Suite 204 
Twin Falls, ID 83301-3029 
Telephone: (208) 733-0700 
Facsimile: (208) 735-2444 
Attorneys for A&B Irrigation District, Burley 
Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, 
North Side Canal Company, and Twin Falls 
Canal Company 
Garrick L. Baxter, ISB #6301 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Water Resources 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720 
Telephone: (208) 287-4800 
Facsimile: (208) 287-6700 
Attorneys for the Idaho Department of Water Resources 
W. Kent Fletcher, ISB #2248 
FLETCHER LAW OFFICE 
P.O. Box 248 
Burley, Idaho 83 318 
Telephone: (208) 678-3250 
Facsimile: (208) 878-2548 
Attorneysfor American Falls 
Reservoir District #2 and Minidoka 
Irrigation District 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
II. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 3 
A. The Settlement Agreement is an incorporated element of 181 C and has legal significance 
to the interpretation and administration of 181 C. Reference to an agreement in a water 
right is not exclusively done as a matter of courtesy .......................................................... 3 
B. The Settlement Agreement, as part of 181C, demonstrates that 12261 can be approved 
with mitigative reference to the recharge actually provided by 181 C because such 
recharge is not "incidental recharge" under Idaho law ..................................................... 15 
C. A transfer of 181 C is not necessary in order for the ground water recharge portion of 
I81C to mitigate for 12261, and therefore, the City does not need the Coalition's 
authorization to file an application such as 12261. ........................................................... 26 
D. The matters raised in this appeal are not barred by Res Judi cat a, nor does it present an 
impermissible collateral attack on 181 C ........................................................................... 31 
E. The Coalition is not entitled to an award of attorney fees ................................................ 34 
III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 35 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Ada Cnty. v. City of Garden City ex rel. Garden City Council, 155 Idaho 914,318 P.3d 904 
(2014) ........................................................................................................................................ 34 
Beach Lateral Water Users Ass 'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 130 P.3d 1138 (2006) ................. 5 
Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n v. Hafer, 158 Idaho 694, 351 P.3d 622 (2015) ................................... 21 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803 (2002) ............................................................... 32 
In re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase 00-91017 (Basin-Wide issue 17-Does Idaho Law Require 
a Remark Authorizing Storage Rights to 'Refill', Under Priority, Space Vacated for Flood 
Control), 157 Idaho 385,336 P.3d 792 (2014) ................................................................... 10, 12 
Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho 207,268 P.3d 1159 (2012) ................................... 27 
North Snake Ground Water Dist. v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res., 160 Idaho 518,376 P.3d 722 
(2016) ........................................................................................................................................ 30 
Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 159 Idaho 798, 367 P.3d 193 (2016) ........................ 34 
Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users' Ass'n. v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237,869 P.2d 554 (1993) .......... 5 
Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39,237 P.2d 93, (1951) .................................................................... 5 
Skinner v. US. Bank Home Mortg., 159 Idaho 642, 365 P.3d 398 (2016) ................................... 34 
Zingiber Inv., LLC v. Hagerman Highway Dist., 150 Idaho 675,249 P.3d 868 (2011) ................. 5 
STATUTES 
Idaho Code§ 42-1425 ................................................................................................................... 24 
Idaho Code§ 42-203A(5) ............................................................................................. 7, 15, 21, 29 
Idaho Code § 42-222 ..................................................................................................................... 29 
Idaho Code§ 67-5279 ......................................................................................................... 3, 36, 37 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.a.iv ........................................................................................................ 21 
IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.a.iv .................................................................................................... 7, 30 
TREATISES 
Memorandum Decision and Order On Challenge, Subcase Nos. 01-23B, 01-297, 35-2543 and 
35-4246 (Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co.) (dated April 4, 2011) (Addendum E) ...... 22, 23, 24 
Memorandum Decision and Order, CV-42-2015-2452 (filed December 14, 2015) (Addendum C) 
····················································································································································· 8 
11 
Memorandum Decision, Basin Wide Issue 17, Subcase No. 00-91017 (filed March 20, 2013), 
vacated in part and ajf'd in part 157 Idaho 385, 393-94, 336 P.3d 792, 800-01 (2014) 
(Addendum D) .......................................................................................................................... 12 
Stipulations for Withdraw} of Protest to Permit No 1-10625 (Addendum A) ................................ 8 
Water Right Permit No. 1-10625 (Addendum 8) ..................................................................... 8, 11 
lll 
Appellant, the City of Blackfoot, through its attorneys of record, Garrett H. Sandow, 
Blackfoot's City Attorney, and Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submits 
Appellant's Reply Brief 1 
T 
J.. INTRODUCTION. 
While the facts of this case have generally been adequately presented by the parties, one 
factual issue deserves to be re-emphasized. In this contested case, the Coalition "stipulated to the 
elements of [Idaho Code] section 42-203A(5)(b)-(f). The parties also stipulated that the modeling 
performed by the City's experts showed that groundwater recharge in Jensen's Grove [under 181C] 
could offset the impacts resulting from the new consumptive uses contemplated under this 
application." Surface Water Coalition's Joint Response Brief("Coalition 's Response Brief'), p. 1 
(footnote and citations to the record omitted). Despite this admitted fact, both the Coalition and 
the Department argue that, as a legal matter, 181 C cannot provide mitigation for 12261. 
The Department focuses on "the face of the [Partial Decree]" in support of its position, 
largely ignoring the Settlement Agreement, and "conclude[s] the City may not use [181C] for 
mitigation or recharge." IDWR Respondents' Brief, p. 14. Thus, without taking the Settlement 
Agreement into account at all, the Department argues that any reference to seepage on the face of 
the water right is not indicative of a right to claim the mitigative benefits of 181 C and, thus argues 
that the City is wrongly collaterally attacking 181 C to get it to say something it does not mean. 
IDWR Respondents' Brief pp. 14-17. Correspondingly, the Department maintains that the City 
For the sake of brevity, the City will use terms in Appellant's Reply Brief as those terms were defined in 
Appellant's Brief 
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must file a transfer to add recharge or mitigation as a beneficial use of 181 C on the face of the 
water right. IDWR Respondents' Brief, pp. 17-18. Only after all of this argumentation does the 
Department substantively consider and assert an interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, 
although its single page of argument only re-emphasizes the Department's position that the City 
must file a transfer, merely because doing so is one possibility under the Settlement Agreement. 
ID WR Respondents ' Brief, pp. 18-19. 
The Coalition provides similar arguments. After briefly arguing that the City must file a 
transfer because the Settlement Agreement was not incorporated into 181 C, the Coalition provides 
more analysis of the incorporated text of the Settlement Agreement. Coalition's Response Brief, 
pp. 9-23. However, the crux of the Coalition's argument is that even under the plain language of 
the Settlement Agreement, the City must file a transfer application. Coalition's Response Brief, 
pp. 18-23. The Coalition also argues generally that res judicata precludes the City's arguments 
and that the seepage occurring under 181 C is only incidental recharge under Idaho Code § 
42-234(5), and therefore cannot be used for mitigation. Coalition's Response Brief, pp. 23-28. 
Finally, the Coalition contends that it is entitled to attorney fees on appeal because the City makes 
the same arguments on appeal that the Department and District Court below rejected. Coalition's 
Response Brief, pp. 29-31. 
The only factor at issue in this contested case, per the Coalition's stipulation, is Idaho Code 
§ 42-203A(5)(a), specifically: whether 12261 "will reduce the quantity of water under existing 
water rights." Undisputed facts demonstrate that 181C provides mitigation for 12261. The 
Settlement Agreement, which is specifically incorporated by reference into 181 C, only requires 
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that the City "file the appropriate application for permit and/or transfer" in order to claim the 
mitigative benefits of 18IC's recharge for the City itself. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 20 
(Paragraph I.e.). The Settlement Agreement only requires that the City obtain the Coalition's 
consent if it decided to file a transfer application, not an application for permit. The City decided 
to file an application for permit, 12261, rather than a transfer application, as contemplated and 
allowed under the plain language of the Settlement Agreement. Unfortunately, after the City 
decided to exercise the rights afforded in the Settlement Agreement to finally pursue formal 
recognition of the benefits of recharge occurring under 181 C, the Department and the District 
Court below exalted form over substance and, rather than looking at the whole of 181 C (including 
the incorporated Settlement Agreement), found that the omission of a specific reference to ground 
water recharge under one specific heading in the water right was determinative of the matter. This 
was reversible error that prejudiced the City's substantial rights, which necessitated this appeal. 
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)-(4). 
II. ARGUMENT. 
A. The Settlement Agreement is an incorporated element of 181 C and has legal 
significance to the interpretation and administration of 181C. Reference to an 
agreement in a water right is not exclusively done as a matter of courtesy. 
The City asserts that the Director and the District Court erred by not analyzing whether the 
Settlement Agreement was incorporated as an element of 181 C. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibits 105 
and 106; A.R., pp. 210-211. In their responses to this appeal, both the Department and the 
Coalition assert that reference to the Settlement Agreement in 181 C has no legal significance to 
defining the elements of 181 C, and instead assert that it is only a "private agreement" and reference 
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to it was only done "as a courtesy to the parties and their successors-in-interest. IDWR 
Respondents' Brief, p. 11 ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Coalition's Response 
Brief, pp. 11-13 (both arguing that the Partial Decree only references the Settlement Agreement). 
The Coalition further asserts that the "[t]he City provides no legal authority for the premise that a 
private settlement agreement will become binding on the Department if a condition is placed on 
the water right referencing that agreement." Coalition's Response Brief, p. 11. Essentially, the 
Department and Coalition assert that all references to settlement agreements are informational only 
and do not implicate the Department in any way because the Department is not a party to the 
Settlement Agreement. In support of this argument, Respondents rely on the words of the transfer 
approval and the Partial Decree to surmise that "enforcement of the agreement is limited to the 
parties to the agreement." Clerk's R., p. 117; see also IDWR Respondents' Brief, p. 11; Coalition's 
Response Brief; pp. 11-12. 
The Department's and Coalition's arguments are misplaced. In support of its position, the 
Department cites to an SRBA decision, attached to IDWR Respondents' Brief as Addendum C, to 
support its contention that references to settlement agreements in the "Other Provisions Necessary" 
section of partial decrees is only ever done as a courtesy to the parties. ID WR Respondents' Brief, 
p. 11, n. 7. In that particular SRBA decision, the provision at issue was a remark making it clear 
that any issues pertaining to access easement rights associated with delivery of water under the 
water right at issue were vested in another jurisdiction. On many different occasions-most 
recently in 2011-this Court has been quite clear that easement matters and water rights matters 
are independent from one another: "In Idaho, ditch rights and water rights are separate and 
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independent from one another." Zingiber Inv., LLC v. Hagerman Highway Dist., 150 Idaho 675, 
249 P.3d 868 (2011); see also Beach Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 130 
P.3d 1138 (2006) ("Although a ditch easement typically concerns the conveyance of water, it is 'a 
property right apart from and independent of questions of water rights"' ( quoting Savage Lateral 
Ditch Water Ur;ers' Ass 'n. v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 242, 869 P.2d 554, 559 (1993)). Thus, the 
"right for the conveyance of water is recognized as a property right apart from and independent of 
the right to the use of the water conveyed therein" and "[e]ach may be owned, held and conveyed 
independently of the other." Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39, 47, 237 P.2d 93, 98 (1951). 
Accordingly, the particular reference made in the memorandum decision for Subcase No. 02-
2318A may have only been included as a courtesy in that particular case because the matter 
referenced in the remark addressed a matter independent from other elements of the water right at 
issue. However, there is nothing in the case suggesting that all remarks or statements under the 
"remarks" and "other provisions necessary" portions of a water right are only made for the 
courtesy of the parties. Accordingly, the Department's reliance on this single SRBA decision is 
not persuasive authority for its asserted position. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Settlement Agreement "is enforceable by the parties thereto," 
A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 106, p. 93 ( capitalization modified), is not surprising. Any judgment, 
decree, or order from any court is not self-effectuating. Its enforcement is dependent on the 
interested parties. An agreement (whether incorporated into a court order or not) must be enforced 
either by a signatory, a party in privity with a signatory, or another plaintiff who can establish 
standing. 
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However, while the Department may not be a .l!!!!Y to a settlement agreement referenced 
in a water right, it necessarily becomes a participant in a water right settlement agreement 
containing additional provisions and/or limitations on the exercise of the right because of the 
Department's statutory duty to administer each water right consistent with its elements under 
Chapter 6 of Title 42. In nearly all cases, the very reason a water right involves a settlement 
agreement is that it resolved a dispute over either the adjudication of a water right or it outlined 
other limitations of the water right to resolve injury concerns and/or protests raised in an 
administrative action involving a water right (such as an application for permit for a transfer 
application). Settlement both in the SRBA and in administrative proceedings was and is actively 
encouraged by the SRBA Court and the Department. In fact, the proceedings involving 12261 
illustrate this encouragement from the Department. 
Immediately after 12261 was protested on October 6, 2014, A.R., pp. 66-68, the 
Department sent two letters, each dated October 20, 2014, to the City and to the Coalition, as the 
protestants. A.R., pp. 69-72, 73-76 (respectively). The letter to the City outlines three options 
available for resolution of the contested application, and all three include some component of 
settlement encouragement and one even specifically references "a mediated agreement" ( each of 
which is emphasized below): 
-Direct contact with the protestant(s) to determine the nature of the 
protests(s) and to attempt to resolve the protest. Sincere conversation 
between the parties prior to initiation of formal proceedings can often 
resolve protest(s). 
-Formal proceedings administered by the department pursuant to the 
Department's Rule of Procedure (IDAPA 37.01.01). A pre-hearing 
conference identifies the protestant's concerns and reviews the resolution 
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possibilities with the parties. If the concerns cannot be resolved, a formal 
hearing will be scheduled. 
-Mediation through a certified professional mediator can reduce costs 
and time that are associated with formal proceedings, present the 
opportunity to address non-water concerns, provide influence over a final 
settlement, and fast track the processing of the application if a mediated 
settlement agreement is reached. If you are interested in this option, 
please contact our office/or details. 
A.R., p. 69 (emphasis added). The Department's letter to the Coalition contains the exact same 
language actively encouraging the parties to settle their concerns. A.R., p. 73. 
Most protestants raise injury arguments, and those issues are resolved either through a 
settlement agreement that resolves those concerns, or the issue is resolved after an administrative 
hearing on the issue. Based on counsel's experience, settlement of contested cases to avoid an 
administrative hearing is never accomplished without some sort of written settlement document. 
And even after an administrative hearing, the hearing officer will often include conditions to 
address injury concerns (which he can do under Idaho Code § 42-203A(5) and IDAPA 
37.03.08.045.01.a.iv. (providing that "[a]n application that would otherwise be denied because of 
injury to another water right may be approved upon conditions which will mitigate losses of water 
to the holder of an existing water right, as determined by the Director")). No matter how the 
conditions get incorporated into a water right, they are often included to address some form of 
injury, and the conditions may not fit neatly or easily into one of what the Respondents would call 
the "explicit" elements of a water right. 2 Three examples are worth noting. 
Clerk's R., p. 113 (''[t]he beneficial uses of 'recharge' and 'mitigation' are not explicitly authorized under water 
right O 1-181 C"). 
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First, a water right permit for ground water recharge (no. 1-10625) was approved after a 
stipulation was entered into between the applicant, Peoples Canal & Irrigating Co., and the 
Coalition, IDFG, BLM, and the Idaho Power Company. A copy of this stipulation is included at 
Addendum A.3 The issued permit included stipulated conditions that further limit the exercise of 
1-10625, a copy of which is included at Addendum B.4 This is an example of a water right permit 
which includes conditions agreed to by the parties. 
Second, after a contested case involving Karl and Jeffrey Cook and their application for 
permit no. 35-14402-which SRBA Judge Wildman ruled on after appeal in his Memorandum 
Decision and Order, CV-42-2015-2452 (filed December 14, 2015)5-the hearing officer imposed 
a condition that neither the applicants nor the Coalition agreed to by limiting the exercise of 35-
14402 and six other base rights to a diversion volume of 1,221 acre-feet. This was done to ensure 
no use of water beyond a determined historical use (had the applicant been held to the diversion 
rate of their base rights) after an analysis by the hearing officer. In other words, it was included 
by the hearing officer to prevent injury to the Coalition, but it was not agreed to by the Coalition 
or the Cooks. 
The third example involves 181 C itself. While the period of use for "diversion to storage" 
under 18IC in authorized between "04-01 to 10-31", AR., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 106, p. 93, 
paragraph 1.d of the Settlement Agreement provides that the City cannot divert into Jensen's Grove 
3 This document is available at httpjiwww.idwr.idah~ov/apJ;lli1ExtSearch/Re1atedDocs.asp?Basin=l&Sequence= 
I 0625&SQlitSuffix=. 
4 A copy of the permit is available at http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/ Docslmages/lzlgOl .PDF. 
5 A copy of this decision is included at Addendum C. 
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until June 1st if the water supply conditions are such that the Bureau of Reclamation "would not 
be granted the opportunity to lease water from the local rental pool for flow augmentation below 
Milner Darn." A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, pp. 19-20. 
Importantly, in these instances where conditions were included in a water right, the 
Department was not a party to the settlement agreement or contested case proceeding that led to 
the condition being included in the water right. But the Department does not have to be a party to 
a settlement agreement to be impacted or bound by the conditions. The Department is not bound 
by contract to a settlement agreement, but it is necessarily a participant to by statute because of 
the Director's statutory obligation to distribute water according to water rights. The Director's 
obligation to distribute water according to water rights was well explained by Judge Wildman: 
The IDWR has a statutory duty to allocate water. The Idaho legislature 
gave the IDWR's Director the power to make appropriation decisions in 
Idaho Code section 42-602: "[t]he director of the department of water 
resources shall have direction and control of the distribution of water from 
all natural water sources within a water district to the ... facilities diverting 
therefrom." The Director also "shall distribute water in water districts in 
accordance with the prior appropriation doctrine." Id. This means that the 
Director cannot distribute water however he pleases at any time in any 
way; he must follow the law. 
Idaho Code section 42-602 gives the Director broad powers to direct 
and control distribution of water from all natural water sources within water 
districts. In re Idaho Dep't of Water Res. Amended Final Order Creating 
Water Dist. No. I 70, 148 Idaho 200, 211, 220 P.3d 318, 329 (2009). That 
statute gives the Director a "clear legal duty" to distribute water. Musser v. 
Higginson, 125 Idaho 392, 395, 871 P.2d 809, 812 (1994) (abrogated on 
other grounds by Rincover v. State Dep't of Fin., 132 Idaho 547, 976 P.2d 
473 (1999)). However, "the details of the performance of the duty are left 
to the director's discretion." Id. Therefore, from the statute's plain 
language, as long as the Director distributes water in accordance with 
prior appropriation, he meets his clear legal duty. Details are left to the 
Director. 
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Similarly, this Court has stated that the Director "is charged with the 
duty of direction and control of distribution of the waters from the streams 
to the ditches and canals." DeRousse v. Higginson, 95 Idaho 173, 179, 505 
P.2d 321,327 (1973). More recently, this Court further articulated the 
Director's discretion: "Somewhere between the absolute right to use a 
decreed water right and an obligation not to waste it and to protect the 
public's interest in this valuable commodity, lies an area for the exercise of 
discretion by the Director." AFRD#2, 143 Idaho at 880, 154 P.3d at 
451. Thus, the Director's clear duty to act means that the Director uses his 
information and discretion to provide each user the water it is decreed. And 
implicit in providing each user its decreed water would be determining 
when the decree is filled or satisfied. 
In re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase 00-91017 (Basin-Wide Issue 17-Does Idaho Law Require 
a Remark Authorizing Storage Rights to 'Refill', Under Priority, Space Vacated for Flood 
Control), 157 Idaho 385, 393-94, 336 P.3d 792, 800-01 (2014). 
In short, it is a red herring to argue that because the Director is not a party to a settlement 
agreement, he is not bound to honor it and distribute water diverted under the conditioned water 
right accordingly.6 He certainly is bound by such conditions as he exercises his statutory duties to 
distribute water, even if such conditions do not "explicitly" fit into one of the standard elements 
of a water right. To use the real world examples discussed above, if the City diverted water into 
Jensen's Grove under 181 C on April 1st in a year where the Bureau of Reclamation "would not be 
granted the opportunity to lease water from the local rental pool for flow augmentation below 
Milner Dam[]"-which would violate paragraph l .d of the Settlement Agreement-the 
6 Again, divorce jurisprudence demonstrates that a court can incorporate documents into its decrees that are not 
drafted by the court or in consultation with the court or any other agency that will administer the subject matter. 
For example, in divorce proceedings, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare will oversee child support 
payments. 
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Department would surely be called upon by the Coalition to curtail the City's diversions into 
Jensen's Grove. As further described beiow, the Coalition certainly could not assume the role of 
the Department and itself perform watermaster functions to curtail the City's use. 
Continuing with actual examples, IDFG would certainly object if Peoples diverted water 
under 1-10625 in an amount that reduced flows in the Snake River below 2,070 cfs measured in 
the Snake River at Blackfoot U.S.G.S. Gage No. 13062500 and the Director did nothing to enforce 
this provision against Peoples or otherwise initiated an enforcement action under Idaho Code § 42-
1701B. Permit No. 1-10625 (at Addendum B) (Condition No. 4). And the Coalition would 
certainly object if water was diverted under 1-10625 if less than 2,700 cfs was flowing past 
Minidoka Dam and the Director did nothing to enforce this provision against Peoples or otherwise 
initiated an enforcement action under Idaho Code § 42-1701 B. Id. (Condition No. 5). These 
conditions were included to protect against local public interest impacts and injury to an existing 
unsubordinated hydropower water right. 
In terms of water distribution in accordance with water rights, there is no private ability 
provided by statute for a private party to assume the role of the Director and shut and fasten 
headgates for non-compliant water users. The protestants can file a complaint with the Director, 
but ultimately, the Director must perform the function of water distribution and if it is not done to 
the satisfaction of the protestants, the remedy is as follows: 
The Director has the authority and discretion to determine how water from 
a natural water source is distributed to storage water rights pursuant to 
accounting methodologies he employs. The Director's discretion in this 
respect is not unbridled, but rather is subject to state law and oversight by 
the courts. See American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2, 143 Idaho at 880, 
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154 P.3d at 451 (addressing court oversight on a properly developed 
record). When review of the Director's discretion is this respect is brought 
before the courts in an appropriate proceeding, and upon a properly 
developed record, the courts can determine whether the Director has 
properly exercised his discretion regarding accounting methodologies. 
Memorandum Decision, Basin Wide Issue 17, Subcase No. 00-91017 at* 11-12 (filed March 20, 
2013), vacated in part and ajf'd in part 157 Idaho 385, 393-94, 336 P.3d 792, 800-01 (2014) 
(hereinafter cited to as "BW 17" and included at Addendum D) (emphasis added). The protestants 
could sue privately for damages for the non-compliance, Idaho Code§ 42-1701B(7), but would 
have no ability to assume the role of the Director in water distribution. The protestants could only 
challenge the exercise of his discretion. This further supports the City's position that the Director 
is a participant in the Settlement Agreement because he is duty-bound to ensure compliance with 
any limitations in the water right, even though he is not a party to the Settlement Agreement. All 
water users should expect that the Director will honor all provisions of a water right, including 
incorporated documents, and ensure compliance with the elements of a water right because the 
Director "cannot distribute water however he pleases at any time in any way; he must follow the 
law." In re SRBA, 157 Idaho at 393,336 P.3d at 800. 
In terms of settlement agreements in general, we cannot think of a stipulated settlement 
agreement referenced in a water right that would not have at least something to do with the water 
right. Otherwise, what is the point of referring to such an agreement in a water right? 
Furthermore, the conditions on 72385, which transferred 181C to Jensen's Grove, provide 
more than mere "notice" of the Settlement Agreement. The language in the transfer approval and 
the partial decree for O 1-181 C states that the terms of the Settlement Agreement provides 
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"conditions and limitations" for the exercise of 181 C. This is a textbook case of incorporation, 
which is explicitly authorized by Idaho Code § 42-1412( 6). Thus, the arguments attempting to re-
characterize the Settlement Agreement7 as only a "private" agreement paints an incomplete picture 
of the mechanics of how water right elements are incorporated into a water right and are later 
enforced or administered by the Department. 
Additionally, the Coalition contends that a settlement agreement may create "additional 
limitations" to a water right, but cannot alter or expand the purposes of any water right. See 
Coalition's Response Brief, p. 13. We agree with this statement as a general matter, but as to the 
specific case before this Court, it fails to address the issue raised by the City on this appeal, which 
is that there is a ground water recharge purpose included within the parameters of 181 C, and 
12261-a new application for water right permit-points back to that ground water recharge as its 
mitigative source of water. 
We agree that a private agreement, on its own, may further limit a water right beyond what 
is provided in the water right. And we agree that it may not expand any element of the water right. 
The provisions of a settlement agreement between two parties could not place a water user in a 
better position than he would be as against other water right holders. On the other hand, a 
document that has been incorporated into the water right' s decree can do anything a decree can 
do, because it is part of the decree. See Idaho Code § 4 2-1412( 6) ( a water right "decree shall 
These include the repeated categorization of the Settlement Agreement as a "private" agreement, see, e.g., IDWR 
Respondents' Brief, p. 11; Coalition's Response Brief, p. 12, and the Department's arguments about the Partial 
Decree describing the Settlement Agreement as "entered into by and between" certain parties (including the City 
and the Coalition, but not the Department), IDWR Respondent's Brief, pp. 11-12. 
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contain or incorporate a statement of each element of a water right"). Correctly considered, a 
document such as the Settlement Agreement, which is incorporated into the water right decree, 
does not alter or expand the water right-it is part of the affirmative definition of the water right. 
Thus, here, the Settlement Agreement does not impermissibly expand 181 C; rather, the Settlement 
Agreement is part of the definition of 181 C and, as described below, see Section II.B., infra, 
describes and provides for the recharge the City now seeks to claim credit for and use as mitigation. 
Finally, both the Department and the Coalition make similar arguments against 
incorporation; wherein the Coalition argues that "absurd results" occur with incorporation, 
Coalition's Response Brief, p. 12, while the Department echoes the District Court's concern that 
incorporation "fundamentally changes" 181 C, ID WR Respondents' Brief, p. 12 ( quoting the 
District Court's opinion). The simple response to both of these arguments is that the Partial 
Decree incorporated the Settlement Agreement by the language chosen by the Department (in the 
approval of 72385, A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 105, p. 90 (Condition 9)) and utilized by the 
SRBA Court (A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 106, p. 93). The Partial Decree says what it says and 
incorporates what it incorporates. The alleged "absurd results" asserted, specifically, that allowing 
incorporation "would allow any water user to simply agree to change the elements of his rights 
without involving the Department in any way" conflates the facts of this case and ignores Idaho 
law. 
Again, Idaho Code§ 42-1412(6) specifically allows for incorporation and the language in 
the Partial Decree incorporates the Settlement Agreement. Obeying Idaho Code § 42-1412( 6) and 
allowing incorporation will not open the door for every water user in Idaho to unilaterally alter 
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water rights; rather, water rights will be construed according to the language that created them first 
(by examining the elements of the water right (including "other provisions necessary") as 
contained on the water right or incorporated through other documents) and then the determination 
must be made as to whether a transfer application under Idaho Code§ 42-222 is necessary. In this 
case, the exercise of 18IC must take the Settlement Agreement into account because the Partial 
Decree incorporates the Settlement Agreement and the terms of the Partial Decree define 181 C. 
Thus, the Settlement Agreement, by definition, cannot "fundamentally change[]" 181 C because the 
Settlement Agreement is part of the definition of 181 C. 
B. The Settlement Agreement, as part of 181C, demonstrates that 12261 can be 
approved with mitigative reference to the recharge actually provided by 181 C 
because such recharge is not "incidental recharge" as described in Idaho Code 
§ 42-234(5). 
In order to fully address the contents of the Coalition's and Department's legal arguments 
asserting that (I) it is necessary for the City to amend 181 C through a transfer before it can be used 
for mitigation purposes, (2) that seepage under 181 C does not authorize the City to use the right 
for recharge, and ( 3) that recharge under 181 C is "incidental recharge," it is necessary to explain 
as straightforwardly and simply as possible the mechanics of what the City proposed with 12261. 
Applications for new water right permits for non-domestic irrigation purposes require 
mitigation. Mitigation is not explicitly defined or described by statute, but use of mitigation 
associated with water in order to issue a new permit for non-domestic irrigation purposes is implied 
from the Department's ability to approve any application "upon conditions." Idaho Code § 42-
203A(5). Those conditions can take many forms, but the overall purpose of mitigation is ensuring 
that the evidence supports a determination that negative impacts from actions undertaken under 
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the new permit will be offset by other positive impacts undertaken by the permit applicant 
Through this mitigation concept, in this case, 12261 attempts to refer back to the recharge 
occurring under 181 C. The City believes it is appropriate to call the seepage referred to both on 
the face of 181 C (Condition No. 5)8 and in the Settlement Agreement as recharge because both 
seepage and recharge are synonymous-they both describe water entering the aquifer. 
Therefore, it is the City's position that it is not necessary for the City to amend 181 C with 
a transfer application because when 181 C was converted from an irrigation water right, what made 
it through the transfer process was outlined on the face of the water right, including the provisions 
of the Settlement Agreement that allowed the recharge benefits to be utilized if the City did one of 
two specific things in the future: (1) file a transfer to amend 181C, which required Coalition 
consent, or (2) file an application for permit, which did not require Coalition consent. 
With specific regard to ground water recharge, we do not view the legal significance of the 
Travis Thompson letter,9 A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 8, pp. 46-47, or the subsequent removal of 
explicit reference to "ground water recharge" on the transfer approval the same way as the 
Coalition or the Department. They assert that ground water recharge did not make it through the 
conversion of 181 C, and a result, the City is bound by law to again amend 181 C to list ground 
water expressly. IDWR Respondents' Brief, p. 16; Coalition's Response Brief, p. 13. 
8 "The reservoir established by the storage of water under this right shall not exceed a total capacity of JI 00 acre 
feet or a total surface area of 73 acres. This right authorizes additional storage in the amount of I 86 afa to make 
up losses from evaporation and 980.8 afa for seepage losses." A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit I 05, p. 90 ( emphasis 
added). 
The City maintains that this letter is parol evidence as described in the City's opening brief, but nevertheless, has 
addressed it previously and addresses it here in the event this Court does not believe it is parol evidence. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 16 
The City views these facts very differently and actually as supportive of what it is 
attempting to do with 12261. As emphasized many times by the Coalition, the City's original 
transfer application expressly requested ground water recharge as an express nature of use. 
Coalition's Response Brief, p. 24. Indeed, the Department's own analysis-as discussed by the 
Coalition in its briefing-was that Jensen's Grove loses water to the aquifer, which later returns 
to the Snake River to benefit surface water users (such as the Coalition) below Blackfoot, and that 
the moment water is recharged it is non-consumptive. Coalition's Response Brief, p. 5. The 
Coalition evidently did not want recharge expressly listed on 181 C because it would permit the 
City to engage in ground water recharge under 181 C for any purpose and for any entity the City 
wanted to assign those ground water recharge benefits to. As a result, the parties agreed to a 
possible future use of the recharge occurring under 181 C, but only for the City. Note the bolded 
portions of Paragraph l.e in the Settlement Agreement, where reference to the Water Right is a 
reference to 181 C and the mitigation and recharge benefits specifically occurring under 181 C: 
e. The CITY shall not lease, sell, transfer, grant, or assign to any other 
person or entity any right to recover groundwater or mitigation for the 
diversion of groundwater as a result of diversions under the Water 
Right including any incidental groundwater recharge that may 
occur as a result of such diversions. Furthermore, the CITY shall not 
request or receive any such mitigation credit on behalf of any other 
person or entity. If the CITY proposes to utilize the Water Right for 
groundwater recharge or mitigation purposes associated with 
existing or future groundwater rights, the CITY must file the appropriate 
application for permit and/or transfer. 
A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 20. 
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The Department evidently interpreted the Settlement Agreement provisions in a manner 
where ground water recharge should be expressly listed because it issued the draft approval 
accordingly. The Coalition disagreed as to the Department's form of documenting what was 
agreed to in the Settlement Agreement as described in the Travis Thompson letter. A.R., Hrg. Exh. 
List, Exhibit 8, pp. 46-47. But the Travis Thompson letter did not purport to amend the Settlement 
Agreement. Accordingly, the City was not necessarily concerned about the form of what right to 
recharge made it through the transfer for 181 C, only that it was there-and it was there in the form 
of Paragraph 1.e incorporated into the elements of 181C. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 9, p. 48. 
This is evidently why the City did not object to the removal of ground water recharge as an express 
beneficial use, Admin. Tr., p. 39, 1. 22-p. 40, 1. 14 (Testimony of Mayor Scott Reese), and it is this 
lack of action that the District Court, the Coalition, and the Department have all seized upon in an 
effort to stop the City from finally capitalizing on the recharge it is indisputably performing. But 
neither the District Court, Department, nor particularly the Coalition have attempted to answer this 
uncomfortable question: If recharge was not an authorized use that made it through the conversion 
of 181 C from an irrigation right to what it is described as now, why does the Settlement Agreement 
specifically provide that the City (and only the City) can seek recognition of the recharge benefits 
under 181 C through filing an application for permit? See A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 20 
(Paragraph 1.e. ). 
It is precisely because the Settlement Agreement required subsequent action by the City 
(such as through the filing of a permit application) that it was more appropriate not to include 
ground water recharge an as an express beneficial use. Otherwise, it could have led to a dispute 
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over whether the City could recharge without restriction by only looking at the face of the water 
right itself when the benefits from the ground water recharge were so severely restricted under the 
Settlement Agreement. As with any contractual dispute, with the benefit of hindsight and now 
knowing the position asserted bv the Coalition to continuallv seek to orevent the Citv from 
- ~ .. o,/ J_ ,.I 
benefitting from the recharge is admits is there, perhaps it would have been best to formally raise 
the issue at that time. However, the provisions of Paragraph l .e. certainly provided the City with 
a reasonable basis to presume that it had reserved its ability to later file an application for permit 
and claim the recharge benefits. And given the provisions of Paragraph 1.e, the City has certainly 
asserted a reasonable basis upon which to submit an appeal to this Court and seek relief from this 
Court. 
Overall, the City now wants to finally claim the benefits of its recharge-something 
everyone admits is actually occurring and is a positive thing. The mechanics of how the City is 
proposing to do that is by filing an application for permit that points back to the ground water 
recharge under 181 C as its mitigative source. The application for water right permit, numbered as 
12261, specifies the conditions under which the new water right can be used, and those new uses 
must be fully mitigated by the mitigative sources it points to. 
The Department also argues that neither recharge nor mitigation could be contemplated by 
the Settlement Agreement because it does not describe either the "period of year" or "quantity of 
water that may be used." IDWR Respondents' Brief, p. 12; see also Coalition's Response Brief, p. 
14 (citing the District Court and making a similar argument). The City would point out that it was 
the Department itself (in the approval of72385) and, later, the SRBA Court (in the Partial Decree, 
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following 72385) that chose to incorporate the Settlement Agreement, rather than re-write the 
required conditions, terms, and elements into 181 C itself in the form (now) preferred by the 
Department. Accordingly, the Coalition's and Department's arguments that there is no season of 
use for the ground water recharge is easily answered by looking at what is proposed under 1226L 
and perhaps unsurprisingly, the season of use for 12261 is the typical irrigation season of use ( 4/1 
to 10/31) when the water seeps into the aquifer from Jensen's Grove when it is filled and used 
during the irrigation season. As to the amount of recharge water, that amount is also clear, 2,080.8 
AF, and the Coalition stipulated to that amount as a proper representation of the recharge that was 
occurring and that should be modeled. And the end use of water under 12261-which recovers 
non-consumptive ground water recharge water for consumptive irrigation purposes-is consistent 
with Paragraph 1.b of the Settlement Agreement where water diverted under 181C is to be used 
for, among other uses, irrigation purposes. By filing 12261, the City will be prevented from using 
2,080.8 AF of recharge water under 181 C for other purposes that the City may desire to use it for. 
At the end of the day, even if 12261 is approved, 181 C will remain as it is currently described on 
the records of the Department-12261 will simply refer to 181 C as its mitigative source. Thus, 
despite the Coalition's and Department's lengthy arguments otherwise, simply put, there is no need 
to amend 181 C through a transfer application because there is nothing in 181 C that is in need of 
amending when the mechanics of how the City is seeking to recognize the recharge benefits 
occurring under 181 C through the filing of 12261. 
Additionally, the City has asserted that pointing to the recharge under 181 C is "non-use" 
of that portion of 181 C because it vvill not change how and where the recharge water is recharged 
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under 181 C, and as a result, this does not require a transfer application. The Coalition contends 
otherwise. Coalition's Response Brief; p. 19-20. Under either view of how to properly view the 
recharge under 181 C, the real question is whether 12661 's pointing back to 181 C's recharge that 
is already occurring (and will not change) is appropriate under Idaho Code § 42-203A(5) and 
IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.a.iv. This Court can make that determination. 
What is very candidly so troubling to the City is that the Coalition repeatedly states that 
since nothing will change with how 18IC is diverted into Jensen's Grove, the City cannot now 
claim its recharge benefits when the benefits of diverting 181 C have accrued to the aquifer for the 
benefit of other water users, such as the Coalition, for over a decade. No transfer should be 
required for the City to point to a use of water that is expressly contained in the Settlement 
Agreement. Indeed, the City's fear in filing such a transfer application is that neither the 
Department or the Coalition will agree to acknowledge the seepage as actual recharge, which may 
force the City to sacrifice some of the remaining consumptive uses authorized under 181 C-such 
as the recreational use or the irrigation component for the adjacent park area-in order to finally 
get some recognition for recharge. 1° Consider the Director's statement in his Final Order wherein 
he states that a transfer is necessary for 181 C: "The analysis of how much water is being 
10 In such a context, the separate enforceability of the Settlement Agreement may become important. For instance, 
despite its incorporation into the Partial Decree, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing-inherent in the 
Settlement Agreement, as in every contract, Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n v. Hafer, 158 Idaho 694, 699, 351 P.3d 
622,627(2015)--provides legal recourse only available in a court and not through the Department. The Coalition 
has argued that the City's concern of being held hostage indefinitely because the Coalition will not agree to a 
transfer proposed by the City is "speculative hyperbole." Coalition's Response Brief, p. 21, n. 19. However, the 
City has proposed such a transfer to the Coalition but received no authorization from the Coalition. When the 
City asked for information about what in the transfer was objectionable to the Coalition, the Coalition did not 
respond and, as a result, the City had to continue pursuit of this appeal. 
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consumptively used, what water is available for mitigation credit, and other information regarding 
the mitigation plan should not be deferred to future proceedings." A.R., p. 273. It is possible, and 
indeed highly likely, that the Director will determine that the current seepage loss in Jensen's 
Grove under 181 C is not being consumptively used, and as a result, such seepage water will not 
be available to be converted to an express listing of ground water recharge as mitigation through 
a transfer. If the City can never claim the benefits of that recharge, the City has no other choice 
but to seek relief from this Court before engaging in further proceedings before the Department 
with unknown and unpredictable results. 
It is also evident that the Coalition will assert in a future transfer application-as it has in 
this appeal-that seepage under 18IC is incidental recharge under Idaho Code§ 42-234(5). Water 
that is properly identified as "incidental recharge," by statute, cannot be used as mitigation for a 
new water right. In the context of 181 C, we do not agree that the recharge occurring under 181 C 
is "incidental recharge" under Idaho Code§ 42-234(5). As to the Coalition's arguments on appeal 
that 181 C's recharge is "incidental recharge," consideration of additional authority from the SRBA 
on the issue of what constitutes "incidental recharge" under§ 42-234(5) is helpful. 
The Court is urged to carefully review the Memorandum Decision and Order On 
Challenge, Subcase Nos. Ol-23B, 01-297, 35-2543 and 35-4246 (Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co.) 
( dated April 4, 2011 ), a copy of which is included on Addendum E attached hereto (hereinafter 
"ASCC Decision"). This decision was issued in conjunction with Aberdeen-Springfield Canal 
Company's ("ASCC") attempt to include "recharge for irrigation" as a beneficial use on its water 
rights in the SRBA. The Department recommended inclusion of this beneficial use under the so-
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called "accomplished transfer statute" found at Idaho Code § 42-1425, and the Coalition timely 
filed objections to these recommendations. ASCC Decision at 3. The Coalition filed a notice of 
challenge to a decision of the special master which addressed a number of issues, including 
whether the surface water lost through the ASCC system was "recharge for irrigation" or 
"incidental recharge" under Idaho Code§ 42-234(5). 
On appeal to the SRBA Presiding Judge, Judge Wildman held that there were issues of 
material fact as to whether recharge claimed by ASCC, prior to November 19, 1987, was incidental 
to its operations, or diverted and used with an express intent to perform ground water recharge as 
a new use. Judge Wildman concluded that an SRBA claimant could establish facts to support a 
recharge purpose of use but that "such a claim would require a showing establishing the benefit to 
the appropriator derived from use of the recharge. Put differently, the claimant must demonstrate 
an identifiable useful or beneficial purpose to the appropriator for the recharge at the time of 
appropriation . ... Groundwater recharge presents a unique set of circumstances because recharge 
can exist without the appropriator or anyone else actually making further use of or benefitting from 
the recharged groundwater." ASCC Decision at 19 (emphasis added). 
Judge Wildman considered the situation where "aquifer recharge is purely an incidental 
result associated with the beneficial use of an existing right," such as when carriage water is 
diverted and used in conjunction with water that is actually delivered to a field for irrigation 
purposes. He concluded that "[s]uch use is considered a complement to the existing irrigation 
right as opposed to a new or additional use. In the event the appropriator does not recapture or 
reuse the water, the result is that the water seeps into and recharges the aquifer." Id. at 20 
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( emphasis added). Judge Wildman concluded that for purposes of applying the accomplished 
transfer statute-a statute that allowed new beneficial uses to be added to a water right without 
going through the formal transfer process of Idaho Code § 42-222-some evidence of intent other 
than simply diversions for irrigation purposes had to be demonstrated. The matter was ultimately 
remanded for further proceedings, and ultimately ASCC's water rights were not decreed with a 
"recharge for irrigation" beneficial use added to their water rights as ASCC did not elect to pursue 
the matter further. 
The ASCC Decision therefore describes that some intent to divert and use water for a new 
or additional use was needed under the accomplished transfer statute (Idaho Code § 42-1425). The 
intent to divert and use water for a new or additional use can be shown in water right documents; 
in ASCC's case, Judge Wildman stated that-as to what was described in the ground water rights 
of ASCC shareholders-the "licenses have legal significance" in determining the water users' 
intent and evidently no provision or evidence of tying those rights to ASCC's diversion of surface 
water was present. ASCC Decision at 23. 
The principles from the ASCC Decision apply to 181 C. First, the City went through the 
formal transfer process to amend 181 C, as opposed to proving historical use under the 
accomplished transfer statute. In the formal transfer process, as described above, what made it 
through the formal process is evidence of intent by the City to use 181 C for recharge or mitigation 
purposes expressly found in Paragraph 1.e of the Settlement Agreement. This express, not implied, 
use for 181 C is not incidental because incidental use is use that is not expressly listed or described 
in the water right. The City's position is that 181 C's seepage is not incidental recharge, even if 
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these losses require the City to continue to divert water to maintain water levels in Jensen's Grove. 
If 181 C said nothing about seepage, or the Settlement Agreement did not contain Paragraph 1.e, 
then such seepage would more appropriately be categorized as "incidental recharge." Otherwise, 
if the Settlement Agreement was actually referring to "incidental recharge" under Idaho Code § 
42-234(5), then there was no legal way for the City to later claim the benefits of that "incidental 
recharge," 11 and, as the Department suggests in its briefing, the Settlement Agreement would 
therefore be void and unenforceable. IDWR Respondents' Brief at 12 (citing to Jensen v. Boise-
Kuna Irr. Dist., 75 Idaho 133,142,269 P.2d 755, 760 (1954) (A contract that is contrary to law is 
ultra vires and void.). 12 
Accordingly, the City urges the Court to determine that when 181 C was converted to 
different beneficial uses from an irrigation-only water right, the different beneficial uses authorized 
in the formal transfer process included ground water recharge. If it did, then what is express cannot 
be implied, and the City should be permitted to now claim the benefits of its 181 C recharge for 
12661 and not be prohibited from doing so by Idaho Code § 42-234(5) (the incidental recharge 
statute). 
II The Settlement Agreement was signed in 2006, and Idaho Code § 42-234, complete with the incidental recharge 
language, was part of Idaho law in 2006. The amendments to Idaho Code § 42-234 in 2009 did not amend the 
incidental recharge language. See 2009 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 242, § I, p. 743. 
12 The City is not asking this Court to determine whether the Settlement Agreement is void and unenforceable in this 
proceeding. If the City does not prevail on this appeal, a determination that the Settlement Agreement is void and 
unenforceable may be pursued in a subsequent legal action. 
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C. A transfer of 181C is not necessary in order for the ground water recharge 
portion of 181C to mitigate for 12261, and therefore, the City does not need 
the Coalition's authorization to file an application such as 12261. 
As described above, because the Settlement Agreement is incorporated into 181 C, it must 
be construed in order to properly interpret 181 C. The Department, Coalition, and District Court 
all view 181 C as separate from the Settlement Agreement. Taken from that point of view, it is 
understandable to conclude that the Settlement Agreement could limit, but not enlarge or alter, the 
water right, and therefore a transfer application would be required. See Coalition's Response Brief, 
p. 14; IDWR Respondents' Brief, p. 12. 
However, this view is flawed from the outset. The Settlement Agreement is not considered 
in addition to 181 C or the Partial Decree-rather, as an incorporated document, the Settlement 
Agreement must be considered as part of 181 C and the Partial Decree. Thus, any contention that 
181C does not list recharge as a purpose of use must, of necessity, utilize the over-formalistic 
analysis that separates the Settlement Agreement from the Partial Decree and requires a water 
right's elements to be listed only in certain places in order to be valid. In contrast, while the City 
acknowledges that such an orderly, well-formed water right decree may be desirable, it is not the 
only form mandated by law, which specifically contemplates the ability to incorporate documents 
into a water right decree. See Idaho Code § 42-1412( 6). 
In their respective briefs, both the Department and the Coalition emphasize Paragraph 1.b. 
of the Settlement Agreement, in an effort to argue that even with the Settlement Agreement, the 
City can only use 181 C for irrigation and recreation. Coalition's Response Brief, p. 16; Coalition's 
Response Brief, p. 16. That paragraph provides: 
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The CITY and [New Sweden Irrigation District] agree that the following 
terms and conditions be included in the Water Right ("Conditions") after 
transfer: .... 
(b) Without the written consent of the COALITION, the CITY agrees to 
hold the Water Right in perpetuity for diversion of water from the Snake 
River into storage at the Pond, for irrigation and recreation purposes, 
and to not transfer the Water Right or change the nature of use or place 
of use of the Water Right. 
A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 19 ( capitalization in original). As an initial matter, the predicate 
of this provision reaffirms the incorporation and intent to incorporate the Settlement Agreement 
into 181 C as "terms and conditions" of 181 C. 
Secondly, the inference drawn by the Department and Coalition conflicts with the very 
interpretation of the Partial Decree posited by the Department and Coalition. The Department 
and Coalition infer from Paragraph 1. b. that 181 C was only meant to allow the use of water "for 
irrigation and recreation purposes." See IDWR Respondents' Brief, p. 18; see also Coalition's 
Response Brief, p. 16. However, once again, this interpretation of 181 C is much too narrow and 
ignores construing 181 C as a whole. In contrast to this interpretation, the City contends that the 
words "irrigation and recreation purposes" generally describe the primary uses of 181 C, rather 
than being an exhaustive list. Instead of construing a single portion of Paragraph 1.b. of the 
Settlement Agreement out of context, the City proposes to interpret the Settlement Agreement and 
the Partial Decree as a whole-particularly the provisions of Paragraph 1.e-in accordance with 
Idaho law. City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425,435,299 P.3d 232,242 (2013); see also 
Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho 207,211,268 P.3d 1159, 1163 (2012). Additionally, 
it is important to note that the end use of water under 12261-which recovers non-consumptive 
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ground water recharge water for consumptive irrigation purposes-is consistent with Paragraph 
1.b of the Settlement Agreement as asserted by the Coalition and the Department, where water 
diverted under 181 C is to be used for irrigation purposes. 
The Coalition asserts that the City cannot "transfer [181 C], or any portion thereof, without" 
the Coalition's consent. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 19 (Paragraph I.a.). The City must 
also "hold [181C] in perpetuity ... and ... not transfer [181C] or change the nature of use or place 
of use of [18 lC]" without the Coalition's consent. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 19 (Paragraph 
1.b.). The City also may "not lease, sell, transfer, grant, or assign to any other person or entity" 
and may "not request or receive ... on behalf of any other person or entity" the mitigative effects 
of the recharge occurring under I81C. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 20 (Paragraph I.e.). 
However, if there was no recharge occurring under 181 C that could provide mitigation in the 
future, it makes no sense for the Settlement Agreement to carve out all of these details, yet allow 
the City itself to use 181 C for mitigation with just the filing of"the appropriate application," A.R., 
Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 20 (Paragraph I.e.), instead of just stating that no mitigation could 
ever be claimed by anyone, anywhere, at any time. Such use of a scalpel, rather than a cleaver, in 
the Settlement Agreement indicates that this issue is more nuanced than the Department or the 
Coalition care to admit. 
If the City itself intended "to utilize [ 181 C] for groundwater recharge or mitigation 
purposes associated with existing or future groundwater rights," the City was required to "file the 
appropriate application for permit and/or transfer." A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 20 
(Paragraph I.e.) (emphasis added). In contrast to all the prior provisions-which either require 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 28 
the Coalition's consent or just outright bar certain actions to be taken-Paragraph 1.e. only 
requires that, in order for the City itself to claim the recharge occurring under 181 C as mitigation, 
the City had to file an appropriate application. 
The application for 12261 is an appropriate application for the City to realize the mitigative 
benefits provided by 181 C. The Settlement Agreement provides, without further definition, that if 
the City itself wants to claim the mitigative benefits of the recharge provided by 181 C "with 
existing or future groundwater rights," the City must "file the appropriate application for permit 
and/or transfer." AR., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 20 (Paragraph I.e.). 12261 is a "future 
groundwater right[]" seeking to claim the mitigation benefits of 181 C, as contemplated in this 
provision. 13 The application for permit 12261 is an "appropriate application for permit and/or 
transfer" in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, because the mitigation provided by 181 C 
is already specified in the Settlement Agreement and 12261 can be granted with reference to 181 C, 
which is an administrative procedure frequently undertaken by the Department. 
13 Footnote 20 of the Coalition ·s Response Brief asserts that it was a "patronizing argument" for the City to assert 
that the Coalition is very familiar with Idaho water law and understood the terms of art associated with filing of 
a transfer application or an application for permit when interpreting Paragraphs I.a or l.b of the Settlement 
Agreement. The City's argument is not patronizing. Contractual interpretation law considers the context of how 
and when an agreement was entered into, including the sophistication of the parties to the agreement. The 
Coalition is very involved in water matters, in many forums, and therefore, the City asserts that the terms used in 
the Settlement Agreement should be interpreted consistent with water law terms of art. In Paragraph I .a. and l .b, 
both paragraphs refer to a "transfer" or to "change the nature of use or place of use" of 181 C as administrative 
actions that require the Coalition's consent, but these provisions do not mention a water right permit application. 
A "transfer" or "change" are terms of art under Idaho water law and are specific to the provisions of Idaho Code 
§ 42-222, not the provisions of Idaho Code§ 42-203A(5) for new permit applications. Because 27-12261 is an 
application for permit, and not a transfer application, the plain language of the provisions of Paragraphs I.a and 
l.b do not require written consent from the Coalition. 
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The Coalition has stipulated that only Idaho Code § 42-203A(5)(a) remains contested. 
Coalition's Response Brief, p. 1. This limits the contested issues to just whether 12261 "will 
reduce the quantity of water under existing water rights." Idaho Code § 42-203A(5)(a). The 
Coalition has "also stipulated that the modeling performed by the City's experts showed that 
groundwater recharge in Jensen's Grove could offset the impacts resulting from the new 
consumptive uses contemplated under [12261]." Coalition's Response Brief, p. I (footnote and 
citation to the record omitted). In short, the Coalition has agreed that the modeling of the annual 
recharge of 2,080.8 AF into the ESPA from Jensen's Grove (together with the other mitigation 
proposed by the City) will-in reality-sufficiently mitigate for 12261, which resolves the issue 
under Idaho Code§ 42-203A(5)(a). 
"There is nothing improper about mitigation as a beneficial use." North Snake Ground 
Water Dist. v. Idaho Dep 't o.f Water Res., 160 Idaho 518, __ c 3 76 P .3d 722, 731 (2016). By 
the same token, that mitigation does not have to be listed as a beneficial use for a water right to be 
used as mitigation. Mitigation is not explicitly defined or described by statute, but use of 
mitigation associated with water is implied from the Department's ability to approve any 
application "upon conditions." Idaho Code § 42-203A(5). The Department has specified that 
"[ a]n application that would otherwise be denied because of injury to another water right may be 
approved upon conditions which will mitigate losses of water to the holder of an existing water 
right, as determined by the Director." IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.a.iv. This singular mention of 
mitigation in the context of a water right application suggests that it is broad and involves analysis 
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of the actual utilization of water. Here, it is uncontested that the actual utilization of 181 C provides 
mitigation for the use proposed by 12261. 
The Coalition proposes to draw a bright-line distinction between mitigation by non-use 
(which the Coalition concedes does not require any transfer application) and mitigation through 
use (which the Coalition argues must always be listed as a beneficial use). Coalition's Response 
Brief, p. 22. This proposed bright-line rule has the appeal of all such rules-it is clear cut and 
definitive. However, it is not the state of the law in Idaho, and should not be adopted by this Court 
for two reasons. First, the Settlement Agreement recognizes the recharge occurring under 181 C, 
with the numerous, involved conditions described above and, because the Settlement Agreement is 
incorporated into the Partial Decree, the City is not changing the nature of use of 181 C. This 
renders the Coalition's argument in this regard moot, or at least beyond the scope of this case. 
Second, considering the mitigation of 181 C separately from the recharge specified in the 
Settlement Agreement, there is no reason to require the creation of a duplicitous transfer 
proceeding, even if it could be combined with a permit proceeding. Doing so would not improve 
the notice to interested parties, nor would it make the administration of water rights by the 
Department any clearer. Mandating such repetition would only increase the difficulty and 
complexity for every applicant as well as the Department, without adding anything. 
D. The matters raised in this appeal are not barred by Res Judicata, nor does it 
present an impermissible collateral attack on 181C. 
The Coalition claims that the "City's arguments are barred by res judicata." Coalition's 
Response Brief, p. 23 ( capitalization modified, emphasis omitted, italics in original). However, 
the doctrine of res judicata "is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 31 
preclusion (collateral estoppel). Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803,805 (2002). 
The Coalition does not distinguish between these two subsets of res judicata nor does the coalition 
describe the elements necessary for either kind of preclusion to apply, except to describe res 
judicata in the most general terms. See Coalition's Response Brief pp. 23-26. 
The matter before this Court is a contractual interpretation case, both as to the elements 
and provisions of 181 C ( a water right, which as described above, is interpreted under principles of 
contractual interpretation) and the Settlement Agreement that the City asserts is part of the water 
right. These issues have not been adjudicated by a court previous to the action now before this 
Court. 
The Coalition seizes on two letters in the record relating to the approval of 72385 in an 
attempt to show that the City has already had its day in court on the issue of recharge under 181 C. 
See Coalition's Response Brief; p. 25 ( citing A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibits 8 and 9). However, 
neither letter provides a legal argument on contractual interpretation. Further, there is nothing in 
the record showing any adjudication--other than inferences drawn from changes in the approval 
of 723 85 from the proposed form of the approval. Nothing shows that a hearing occurred, that the 
parties briefed the issue, or that a decision was issued. The law-regardless of the forum-cannot 
operate merely by letter. Thus, there is no decision that would preclude or bar the City's arguments 
raised in this appeal. 
In a similar vem, the Department argues that the City's position "constitutes an 
impermissible collateral attack on the [Partial Decree]" because the Department characterizes the 
City's argument as asking this Court to "interpret the [Partial Decree] ... inconsistent with the 
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plain language of the purpose of use element" of 181 C. ID WR Respondents' Brief, p. 15. The 
implicit assumption in the Department's argument is that only the face of the Partial Decree is 
valid. What the Department means by the "purpose of use element," ID WR Respondents' Brief, 
p. 15, is just that portion of the Partial Decree under the heading "PURPOSE AND PERIOD OF 
USE." A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 106, p. 92. Based on this position, the Department largely 
continues to refuse to consider the Settlement Agreement. 
The City's position is that the Settlement Agreement is incorporated into the Partial 
Decree. The Department and the District Court both erred by denying acknowledgement of that 
incorporation. The City is contending that 181 C provides sufficient mitigation for 12261 because 
(1) the Settlement Agreement is incorporated, (2) any element of a water right can be listed and/or 
further described or limited anywhere in the decree ( even not under the heading of the form decree) 
and is of equal importance, and (3) the Settlement Agreement specifically provides for recharge 
and/or mitigation with some specific limitations. This case is not a collateral attack on the Partial 
Decree-rather, it is the City's effort to recognize the mitigative benefits specified in the 
Settlement Agreement and the recognition of seepage on the face of 181 C, which are inextricable 
parts of 181 C. While an interpretation inconsistent with a decree's plain language may constitute 
an impermissible collateral attack, here the Department and the District Court below refused to 
consider all of the plain language, and erred by using just a portion of the Partial Decree-
particularly by failing to acknowledge the Settlement Agreement-to determine the merits of the 
City's argument. 
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E. The Coalition is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
The Coalition argues that it should be awarded attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117. 
Coalition's Response Brief, pp. 29-31. The Department has not asserted a claim for fees. The core 
of the Coalition's argument is that the City has lost in three separate forums, and has continued to 
raise the same arguments and, therefore, the Coalition should be awarded attorney fees on appeal. 
Coalition's Response Brief, pp. 30-31. 
The Coalition's argument wrongfully attempts to place the City on the horns of a dilemma. 
On the one hand, the Coalition points out that it is improper to merely ask this Court to "'second-
guess' the District Court," and the Coalition also contends that "the City has advanced the same 
... arguments at every turn." Coalition's Response Brief, p. 30. On the other hand, what the 
Coalition fails to acknowledge is that "[t]his Court has repeatedly held: To properly raise an issue 
on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the court below or the issue must have been 
raised in the court below, an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Skinner v. US. 
Bank Home Mortg., 159 Idaho 642, 650, 365 P.3d 398, 406(2016) ( citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The resolution to these principles lies in the "good faith basis" to appeal. Coalition's 
Response Brief, p. 29 (quoting Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 159 Idaho 798, __ , 
367 P.3d 193,207 (2016)). Where an appellant has "brought the appeal in good faith" and raised 
a "genuine issue of law" an award of attorney fees is inappropriate. Ada Cnty. v. City of Garden 
City ex rel. Garden City Council, 155 Idaho 914, 919, 318 P.3d 904, 909 (2014)( citation omitted). 
The City has a good faith basis to believe that the Department and the District Court erred by 
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refusing to consider the Settlement Agreement by exalting form over substance in determining that 
elements must be listed only on the face of a decree under a certain heading. The City has 
continued to refine its arguments to convey its position in this matter, and has not raised all of the 
exact same arguments to this Court that were previously made below. The issue of incorporation 
in water right decrees in general, as well as in this particular Partial Decree, required the 
clarification of this Court. The City could not simply walk away from a Settlement Agreement in 
believed preserved a critical component for its future growth-ground water recharge occurring at 
Jensen's Grove-against the other party to that contract (the Coalition). This is especially the case 
given the plain reading of Paragraph l .e of the Settlement Agreement. 
Finally, even though the City and Coalition may disagree as to how the Settlement 
Agreement should be interpreted, it cannot be said that the positions asserted by the City are 
unreasonable. It is not unreasonable for the City to seek a proper interpretation of 181 C and the 
Settlement Agreement. Thus, even were the Coalition to prevail on appeal (which it should not), 
the Coalition should not be awarded attorney fees. The City has pursued the appeal in good faith. 
III. CONCLUSION. 
The uncontroverted facts show that 12261 will not reduce the amount of water available to 
other water rights because of the mitigative benefits provided by 181 C. Each year, 2,080.8 AF 
enters the ESPA from Jensen's Grove on account of diversions under I81C. The Settlement 
Agreement-which was incorporated into the Partial Decree-allows the City, itself, to claim 
credit for these mitigative benefits if it files "the appropriate application for permit and/or transfer." 
A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 20 (Paragraph 1.e.). The City has done just that by filing 12261. 
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The Department and District Court below erred by refusing to consider the Settlement 
Agreement, despite its incorporation into the Partial Decree; exalting form over substance by 
requiring all of a specific element to be in one, and only one, location on the Partial Decree; and 
by requiring the City to file a transfer in addition to the current application to add a use to 181 C 
that is already contemplated in the Settlement Agreement. See Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). These 
errors violate the statutory provisions allowing a water right decree to incorporate elements, Idaho 
Code§ 42-1412(6); specifying that an (entire) decree defines a water right, id.; and allowing the 
City to file an application for permit, Idaho Code § 42-203A. These errors were also made in 
excess of the statutory authority of the Department, which has no authority to ignore incorporated 
portions of water rights. Further, these errors were made upon an unlawful procedure, wherein the 
Department refused to consider the Settlement Agreement, which explicitly provides for 
recharge/mitigation, despite its being incorporated into the Partial Decree. The Department's 
decision is not supported by substantial evidence because, instead of considering the plain 
language of the Partial Decree and the Settlement Agreement, the Department improperly 
considered extrinsic evidence and only certain portions of the Partial Decree. Finally, this 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion because the Department frequently 
issues new permits that reference mitigation provided by another water right without requiring a 
transfer be filed on the mitigating water right. 
These errors have prejudiced the City's substantial rights, which include an interest in the 
correct adjudication of its water right and the full consideration of the complete Partial Decree, 
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which included the Settlement Agreement. Idaho Code § 67-5279(4). For these reasons, the 
Department's decision below should be reversed. 
Dated this -z,~ay of November, 2016. 
~L., (_-# I 
Robert L. Harris, Esq. ~::'.'.'!:52'. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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Addendum A 
to the 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
Stipulations for Withdrawal of 
Protest to Permit No. 1-10625 
James Cefalo 
Hearing Officer 
Idaho Department of Water Resources 
900 N. Skyline Drive, Suite A 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402-1718 
Email: rharrisfaJ10ldcnk!!al.com 
June 13, 2014 
RE: Executed Stipulations for Witltdrawal of Protest for Application for Permit Nos. 
01-10625 and 01-10626 in the Name of Peoples Canal a11d Irrigation Company 
and Snake River Valley Irrigation District, Respectively~ and tlie Idaho 
Department of Fish & Game. 
Dear James: 
Enclosed are two Stipulations for Withdrawal of Protest entered into between the Peoples 
Canal and Irrigation Company and the Snake River Valley Irrigation District and the Idaho 
Depatiment of Fish & Game with regards to the above-referenced applications for permit. The 
stipulations provide for certain conditions to be included in the permits for these applications and 
their eventual licenses should they be licensed. As provided in paragraph 2, with these stipulations 
and others, we propose that they be incorporated and then circulated amongst the parties as a 
proposed order. The parties will then be able to review the language in the permits to ensure that 
their conditions are there. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please let me know. 
Best Regards, 
Robert L. Harris 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
Enclosures 
Jerry R. Rigby, Esq. (ISB #2470) 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY 
P.O. Box250 
25 N. 2nd E. 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Telephone: (208) 356-3633 
Facsimile: (208) 356-0768 
Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB #7018) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Peoples Canal & Irrigation Co. 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 01-10625 IN THE NAME OF 
PEOPLES CANAL & IRRIGATION CO. 
STIPULATION FOR 
WITHDRAW AL OF PROTESTS 
THIS STIPULATION WITHDRAW AL OF PROTESTS (this "Stipulation") is 
made and entered into as of the day of 2014, by and between Peoples 
Canal & Irrigation Company (hereinafter, "Peoples"), and the Idaho Department of Fish and 
Game ("IDFG"). Peoples and the IDFG may hereinafter collectively be referred to as the 
"Parties." 
RECITALS: 
Appiication for Permit No. 01-10625 (hereinafter, simply "Oi-10625") seeks a water 
right from the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR") for 350 cfs with a 
3 water recharge purposes Bingham 
Idaho. 
B. On September 24, 2012, after 01-10625 was advertised pursuant to Idaho law, it was 
protested on various grounds by the IDFG. 01-10625 was also protested by the United 
States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (hereinafter, "BLM"), the 
Surface Water Coalition (the "SWC"), and th.e Idaho Power Company ("IPCO"). 
C. Peoples desires to conduct managed ground water recharge both within the Peoples Canal 
and at off-canal sites with recharge water delivered through the Peoples Canal. In both 
instances, it is proposed that the ground water recharge will be measured and monitored 
on a continuous basis. A map of the proposed recharge place of use primarily within the 
Peoples Canal is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
D. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-602 et seq., the State of Idaho, acting through IDWR, is 
charged with the orderly distribution of water consistent with the prior appropriation 
doctrine within the State of Idaho. Idaho Water District #1 ("Water District #1 ") is the 
instrumentality by which IDWR administers water rights in the Upper Snake River Basin. 
E. Idaho Code § 42-234 vests IDWR with the authority to grant permits and licenses for 
ground water recharge subject to later control from the director: 
(4) The director of the department of water resources may regulate the 
amount of water which may be diverted for recharge purposes and may 
reduce such amount, even though there is sufficient water to supply the 
entire amount originally authorized by permit or license. To facilitate 
necessary financing of an aquifer recharge project, the director may fix a 
term of years in the permit or license during which the amount of water 
authorized to be diverted shall not be reduced by the director under the 
provisions of this subsection. 
(5) To ensure that other water rights are not injured by the operations 
of an aquifer recharge project, the director of the department of water 
resources shall have the authority to approve, disapprove or require 
alterations in the methods employed to achieve ground water recharge. In 
the event that the director determines that the methods of operation are 
adversely affecting existing water rights or are creating conditions adverse 
to the beneficial use of water under existing water rights, the director shall 
order the cessation of operations until such alterations as may be ordered 
by the director have been accomplished or such adverse effects otherwise 
have been corrected. 
Idaho Code§ 42-234(4)-(5). 
F. Idaho Code§ 42-1737(a) requires the approval of ground water recharge projects by the 
STIPULATION AND WITHDRAWAL OF PROTESTS - 2 
Idaho Water Resource Board for project proposals that seek "the diversion of natural 
flow water appropriated pursuant to section 42-234, Idaho Code, for a managed recharge 
project in excess often thousand (10,000) acre-feet on an average annual basis ... " 
G. In lieu of participating in administrative hearings concerning O 1-10625, as provided for 
under Idaho law, the Parties hereby agree as set forth below, the result of which is 
withdrawal of the Protestants' protests and issuance of a permit for development of 01-
10625. 
AGREEMENTS: 
1. Conditions To Be Included On Permit for 01-10625. IDWR shall include the 
following conditions, in addition to any others that may be included by IDWR or 
otherwise agreed to with the other protestants (provided they do not conflict with the 
following conditions) in the final order issuing Permit No. 01-10625: 
a. "Water may only be diverted under this right in an amount that does not reduce 
flows in the Snake River below 2,070 cfs measured in the Snake River at 
Blackfoot U.S.G.S. Gage No. 13062500." 
b. ''Absent engineering controls to prevent fish entrainment into recharge facilities, 
when any amount of water is available for diversion under this right, and after 
consultation by the right holder with the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the 
amount of water diverted under this right from the river will be adjusted up and 
down at a rate which minimizes the possibility of fish entrainment in the recharge 
facilities. Provided, however, that flows diverted into recharge facilities may be 
adjusted, without consultation, by Water District No. 1 personnel consistent with 
its statutory duties to regulate and adjust diversions when all or a portion of this 
right is no longer in priority." 
c. "Diversions off of the right holder's private canals to designated off-canal 
recharge sites shall be designed and constructed as necessary to minimize 
negative impacts to fish. The right holder shall provide information concerning 
the design of such diversion structures to the Idaho Department of Fish and Game 
for review and comment prior to construction." 
d. "Upon a good faith request from the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the 
right holder shall meet to discuss and attempt to resolve in good faith any 
concerns associated with the exercise of this right and potential negative effects 
on fish and wildiife resources." 
1. No Requirement for Screening of Peoples Canal Heading. To ensure there is no 
confusion with the interpretation of paragraph 1.c. above, the Parties agree that nothing in 
this Stipulation shall require Peoples to install fish screens or other equipment at the 
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Peoples Canal diversion heading on the Snake I Paragraph l .c. only requires 
installation of such equipment for the diversion structures associated with off-canal 
recharge sites that divert from the Peoples Canal or a lateral canal or ditch that diverts 
from the Peoples Canal. Notwithstanding the above, nothing herein shall prevent the 
Parties from agreeing in the future to the installation of fish screens or other equipment at 
the diversion heading pursuant to terms and conditions agreed to by the Parties. 
Issuance of Proposed Order and Subsequent Withdrawal of Protests. The Parties 
shall instruct IDWR to issue a proposed order including the conditions set forth in 
Paragraph 1 as set forth herein. The Parties shall have fourteen ( 14) days thereafter to 
object to the language in the proposed order by filing notice of such objection with 
IDWR if the conditions set forth in Paragraph 1 are not included. If no objections are 
received within the fourteen (14) day time period, the protests of the Protestants shall be 
deemed withdrawn, and IDWR shall thereafter issue a final order approving 01-10625 
consistent with this Agreement. Peoples may submit a copy of this executed Stipulation 
to IDWR and notify IDWR of this procedure and withdrawal of protests. If IDWR does 
not include the conditions agreed to in Paragraph I, this stipulation shall be deemed null 
and void and the Parties will retain their respective rights in this contested case, unless 
the Parties otherwise agree to IDWR's conditions. 
Reservation of Rights. The Parties agree and acknowledge that this Stipulation only 
resolves the protests to O 1-10625, and that the Protestants reserve all rights to protest 
other applications for ground water recharge permits, transfers, and any other 
proceedings. The Parties shall not use this Stipulation in any other administrative or 
judicial proceedings for any purpose, other than an action to enforce its terms as provided 
in paragraph 8 below. 
Reliance Upon Statements/Integration and Merger. The Parties hereto specifically 
acknowledge that they were represented by counsel in this matter, and agree that other 
than as is set forth herein, they have executed this Stipulation without relying upon any 
statements or representations written or oral, as to any statement of law or fact made by 
any other party or attorney. The Parties to this Stipulation have read and understand the 
Stipulation, and warrant and represent that this Agreement is executed voluntarily and 
without duress or undue influence on the part of or on behalf of any party. This 
Agreement represents the sole entire and integrated Stipulation by and between the 
parties hereto, and supersedes any and all prior understandings or agreements whether 
written or oral except as specifically provided herein. 
5. Successors and Assigns. This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the 
benefit of each Parties' officers, directors, shareholders, heirs, successors and assigns, 
and shail be specifically enforceable. 
1 The legal description for the Peoples Canal diversion is the NWSENE of Section 26, Township 1 S, Range 
36E. 
STIPULATION AND WITHDRAW AL OF PROTESTS - 4 
6. 
By: W. Dallas Burkhalter, of the Idaho Attorney 
General's Office 
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Issued Permit No. 1-10625 
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Priority: June 19, 2013 
State of Idaho 
Department of Water Resources 
Permit to Appropriate Water 
N0 .1-10625 
Maximum Diversion Rate: 350.00 CFS 
This is to certify, that PEOPLES CANAL & IRRIGATION CO 
1050W HWY39 
BLACKFOOT ID 83221 
has appl ied for a permit to appropriate water from: 
Source: SNAKE RIVER Tributary: COLUMBIA RIVER 





P~RIQP OF USE RATE OF DIVERSION 
01/01 to 12/31 350.00 CFS 
r '\/; 
LOCATION OF POINT($) OF DIYERStQN:.. .. ., 
SNAKE RIVER L 1 (NW%SE%N,El4) Sec:4?.§ ·.· Twp 01 S Age 36E, B.M. BINGHAM County 
Page2 State of Idaho 
Department of Water Resources 
Permit to Appropriate Water 
N0.1 -10625 
PLACE OF USE: GROUND WATER RECHARGE 
Twp Age Sec I NE I NW I SW I SE I 
1 NE l NW l m 1 SE l NE 1 ~ 1 SW l SE l NE 1 NW l SW 1 ~ 1 NE l NW 1 SW l fil;. l Totals 
018 36E 26 I X I X I X X I I 
I L 17 I L3 I L4 L4 I I 
I I L17 I I 
018 36E 27 I I I X X X I 
i I I L 2 L 11 
I I I L4 I 
018 36E 28 I I I X I 
I I I I 
018 36E 33 I X X I X X I X X X I 
I I I I 
018 36E 34 I X I X X X X I I 
I L 10 I L 1 L 3 I I 
028 34E 5 I I ,,, I X I 
I f1 I I 
028 34E 8 I X I f X X X X I X X X I 
I I ; I I 
028 34E 9 I 11 X X X I I 
I I l I I 
028 34E 12 I IJ I X I 
I I I L 4 I 
028 34E 13 I X X X I X X X X I X X X X I 
IL1 L2l IL3 L41 
: :: :: i :: '::'\ X : X i X X X X :I 
028 34E 16 f X X X X I X X X I I X X I 
I I I I I 
028 34E 17 I X X I I I X X I 
028 34E 20 I X X I 1,("' ,,,, ,, 11 X X I 
I I I I 
02S 34E 22 I X X I X X X X I X X I 
I I I I 
02834E23IX XX I X IX XX I 
I I I I 
02S34E27I IX X I I 
I I I I 
02S34E 28 IX X X IX X X X X IX X X I 
I I I I 
02S 34E 29 I X X I X X I X X X I 
I I I I 
028 34E 31 I X I I X X I 
I I I L 1 I 
02S34E32I XI XX X IX XI 
I I L 4 I L 1 I 
02S34E33IX X XI X XIX XX XI 
I I L4 L3l L2 L11 
02S34E 34 I X I X X X IX X I 
I I I I 
02S35E1I I XI X XI 
I I I I 
02S35E4I I XX I I 
I I I I 
02S35E5I I I IX j 
I I I I I 
02S 35E 7 I I I X I X X I 
I I I L 4 I I 
Page3 State of Idaho 
Department of Water Resources 
Permit to Appropriate Water 
N0.1-10625 
02S 35E a I X I i X XI X XI 
I I ! I I 
02$ 35E 9 I X X X I X X X XI X X XI X X X XI 
I I I I I 
02S 35E 10 I I I X XI X X X I 
I I I I I 
02S 35E 11 I X X I X XI X I I I I I I I I I 
02$ 35E 12 I I X X X I I I 
I I I I I 
02S 35E 15 I I X I I I 
I I I I I 
02S 35E 1a I X X X I X XI X X XI I 
I I I I I 
02$ 35E 17 I X X X X I X X X I X X XI I 
I I I I I 
02S 35E 1a I X X X X L X X X XI X X X XI X X XI 
I r: L 1 L2 I l3 l4 I 
02S 35E 20 I p X X I I 
I I .. I I 02$ 36E 4 I I ~ I i 
I I L3 I I 
02S 36E s I X X I X X XI X I 
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CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL 
1. Proof of application of water to beneficial use shall be submitted on or before November 01, 2019. 
2. Subject to all prior water rights. 
3. Use of water under this right wi!! be regulated by a watermaster with responsibility for the distribution 
of water among appropriators within a water district. At the time of this approval, this water right is 
within State Water District No. 01. 
4. Water may only be diverted under this right in an amount that does not reduce flows in the Snake 
River below 2,070 cfs measured in the Snake River at Blackfoot U.S.G.S. Gage No. 13062500. 
5. Water may only be diverted for recharge under this right when 2,700 cfs or more is flowing past 
Minidoka Dam. 
6. The diversion of water under this right shall not exceed ten thousand (10,000) acre-feet on an 
average annual basis. ! 
7. Absent engineering controls to /prevent fis.h entrainment into recharge facil ities, when any amount of 
water is available for diversion under thisYright, and after consultation by the right holder with the 
Idaho Department of Fish andiGame, the ar\iount of water diverted under this right from the river will 
be adjusted up and down at a ~' wt)~h mi~!mizes the possibility of fish entrainment in the 
recharge facil ities. Provided, however ~that ftows diverted into recharge facilities may be adjusted, 
without consultation, by Water Dlstrict No. 1\persc;,nnel consistent with its statutory duties to regulate 
and adjust diversions when all orj a portion of Ulis right is no longer in priority. 
8. Diversions off of the right holder'~ private canals to clg_~igna!ei;t otf; canal recharge sites shall be 
designed and constructed as necessary to minimize ne'gfiliveHffipigs to fish. The right holder shall 
provide information concerning the design of such diversion structu f~s to the Idaho Department of 
Fish and Game for review and comment prior to construction.< ~j 
9. Upon a good faith request fro~the Idaho Oepartmdnt of FISh and ~ime, the right holder shall meet 
to discuss and attempt to resolve\ in gpod fajtt, any concerns associa'ted with the exercise of this 
right and potential negative effect's on fish l nd wildllfe resources. f ' ~ 10. This right is subject to all applicabl~ provisions of SectiQO 42-234, Idaho Code. 
11 . During the development period of ttiis pennlt, the permit holder agrees to obtain all right-of-way 
authorizations that may be required, if any, by the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau 
of Land Management under Title V of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 as 
amended (43 U.S.C. 1761) and the regulations found in 43 CFR 2800, in order to transport water 
diverted under this right across BLM land. 
12. Pursuant to Section 42-234(4), Idaho Code, to ensure that other water rights are not injured by the 
operations of the recharge project authorized by this right, the Director has authority to approve, 
disapprove, or require alterations in the methods employed to achieve ground water recharge. 
13. Pursuant to Section 42-234(3), Idaho Code, the Director may reduce the amount of water that may 
be diverted for recharge purposes under this right even though there is sufficient water to supply the 
entire amount authorized for appropriation under this right. 
14. Approval of this permit does not constitute approval by the Idaho Water Resource Board as may be 
required pursuant to Section 42-1737, Idaho Code. 
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15. The right holder shall record the daily quantity of water diverted for ground water recharge and shall 
report the diversion data for the prior calendar year to the Department by February 1 each year. 
Reporting shall occur in the manner specified by the Department, consistent with Section 42-701, 
Idaho Code. To facilitate this reporting requirement, the right holder shall install and maintain a 
totalizing measuring device approved by the Department at each point of diversion and at each 
point where water is delivered from the conveyance system into a designated recharge site. 
16. Consistent with Section 42-234(5), Idaho Code, seepage from canals incidental to delivery of 
irrigation water shall not be considered ground water recharge under this right. Canal seepage will 
be considered to be ground water recharge only when the canals are not conveying water for 
irrigation or other beneficial uses. 
17. Prior to the diversion and use of water under this approval, the right holder shall comply with 
applicable water quality permitting requirements administered by the Department of Environmental 
Quality or the Department of Agriculture. 
!,;, tii'' 
18. This right does not grant any right.!of-way or easement across the land of another. 
19. Project construction shall comrhence within one year from the date of permit issuance and shall 
proceed diligently to completio? unless it[9an be shown to the satisfaction of the Director of the 
Department of Water Resources that delays1were due to circumstances over which the permit 
holder had no control. r' · .,i 
This permit is issued pursuant to the fprovislon~d?
0
$~8tion 42-204, Idaho Code. Witness the signature of 
the Director, affixed at Boise, this £ -th d~y ot _ _ "cJ_'.~_·C,_i)-D....._h_CI~------' 20J.!:L. 
~ - ~~ ~. 
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• l . 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This case originated when the Coalition filed a Petition seeking judicial review of a final 
order of the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR" or "Department"). 1 
The order under review is t.lie Preliminary Order Issuing Permit entered on May 15, 2015. The 
Preliminary Order approves application for permit number 35-14402 in the names of Karl and 
Jeffrey Cook (collectively "the Cooks"). The Coalition asserts that the Preliminary Order is 
contrary to law and requests that this Court set it aside and remand for further proceedings. 
B. Course of proceedings and statement of facts. 
This matter concerns an application to appropriate water filed by the Cooks. R., pp.1-5. 
The application was filed on August 29, 2014. Id. It seeks to appropriate 3.07 cfs of ground 
water for the irrigation of 560 acres in Jefferson County. 2 Id. The proposed point of diversion is 
a pre-existing ground water well that services the Cooks' property. Id. at I. Aside from the 
application, the Cooks hold six other ground water rights for the irrigation of the same 560 acres. 
Id. at 3; Ex. 103-108. Those rights are diverted via the Cooks' well and cumulatively permit 
them to withdraw ground water at rate of diversion of 5.13 cfs up to a maximum diversion 
volume of 2,187.8 acre-feet annually. Id. The intent of the application, as stated therein, is to 
authorize the withdrawal of water via the welJ at a higher rate of diversion "with NO 
INCREASE in the decreed Diversion Volume .... " R., p.3. In other words, the Cooks' 
application seeks an additional water right to withdraw ground water at a higher rate of diversion 
on the representation that they will not increase their total annual diversion volume as a result of 
the new appropriation. Id. 
The Cooks' application was protested by the Coalition. Id at 10-12. Among other 
things, the Coalition asserted that the Cooks failed to establish the new appropriation will not 
1 The term "Coalition" :refers collectively to the A&B Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation District, American Falls 
Reservoir District #2, Minidoka Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, North Side Canal Company and Twin 
Falls Canal Company. 
2 Although the Cooks' application seeks to appropriate 5.0 cfs on its face, the Cooks clarified and confinned at the 
administrative hearing that they intended only to seek the appropriation of3.07 cfs. R., p.48. Ex.IOI, p.4. 
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reduce the quantity of water under existing water rights. Id. An administrative hearing was held 
before the Department on April 24, 2015. Tr., pp.1-202. Department employee James Cefalo 
acted as hearing officer. Id. at 5. On May 15, 2015, he issued his Preliminary Order, finding 
that the proposed appropriation will not reduce the quantity of water under existing water rights 
so long as it is appropriately conditioned. Id. at 53. To ensure no injury, the hearing officer held 
that "Permit 35-14402 and the existing ground water rights on the Cooks' property should be 
limited to a combined maximum annual diversion volume of 1,221 acre-feet." Id. at 56. The 
hearing officer proceeded to issue Permit to Appropriate Water No. 35-14402 in the names of 
Karl and Jeffrey Cook with the following conditions: 
3. Rights 35-7280, 35-7281, 35-13241, 35-14334, 35-14335, 35-14336 and 35-
14402 when combined shall not exceed a total diversion rate of 8.20 cfs, a total 
annual maximum diversion volume of 1,221 af at the field headgate, and the 
irrigation of 560 acres. 
4. To mitigate for the depletion of water resulting from the use of water under this 
right and to prevent injury to senior water right holders, the right holder shall 
never exceed the combined annual volume limit included in the conditions for this 
right. 
5. Use of water under this right will be regulated by a watermaster with 
responsibility for the distribution of water among appropriators within a water 
district. At the time of this approval, this water right is within State Water District 
No. 120. 
6. Prior to diversion of water under this right, the right holder shall install and 
maintain a totalizing measuring device of a type approved by the Department as a 
part of the diverting works. 
9. Noncompliance with any condition of this right, including the requirement for 
mitigation, is cause for the director to issue a notice of violation, cancel or revoke 
the right, or, if the right is included in a water district, request that the watermaster 
curtail diversion and use of water. 
Id. at 57. 
On June 25, 2015, the Coalition filed the instant Petition for Judicial Review, asserting 
that the hearing officer's Preliminary Order is not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record and is contrary to law. The case was reassigned by the clerk of the court to this Court on 
that same date. The parties subsequently briefed the issues raised on judicial review. On 
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October 26, 2015, the Court entered an Order permitting the Cooks to appear as intervenors. A 
hearing on the Petition was held before the Court on December 3, 2015. The parties did not 
request the opportunity to submit additional briefing and the Court does not require any. 
Therefore, this matter is deemed fully submitted for decision on the next business day or 
December 4, 2015. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Judicial review of a final decision of the director of IDWR is governed by the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act ("IDAPA"). Under IDAPA, the court reviews an appeal from an 
agency decision based upon the record created before the agency. LC. § 67-5277. The court 
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on 
questions of fact. I. C. § 67-5279( l ). The court shall affirm the agency decision unless it finds 
that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; ( c) 
made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3). Further, the 
petitioner must show that one ofits substantial rights has been prejudiced. LC.§ 67-5279(4). 
Even if the evidence in the record is conflicting, the Court shall not overturn an agency's 
decision that is based on substantial competent evidence in the record. Barron v. IDWR, 135 
Idaho 414,417, 18 P.3d 219,222 (2001). The Petitioner bears the burden of documenting and 
proving that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's decision. 




A. The bearing officer's Preliminary Order is affirmed. 
An application for permit to appropriate water is evaluated against the criteria set ford1 in 
Idaho Code§ 42-203A. One criterion is whether the proposed appropriation "will reduce the 
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quantity of water under existing water rights. "3 LC. § 42-203A(5). If so, the Department may 
deny the application. Id. However, an application that may otherwise be denied because of 
injury to another water right "may be approved upon conditions which will mitigate losses of 
water to the holder of an existing water right, as determined by the director." ID APA 
37.03.08.045.01.a.iv. 
The hearing officer recognized that the appropriation proposed by the Cooks constitutes a 
consumptive use of water. R., p.51. As such, without mitigation the appropriation will reduce 
the quantity of water available under existing water rights. Id. To prevent such a reduction, the 
hearing officer required mitigation from the Cooks in the form of a cutback in the annual 
diversion volume authorized under their other six water rights. Id. at 56. He ultimately 
determined that if the maximum diversion volume of the new appropriation and the other six 
water rights is limited to 1,221 acre-feet annually, the new appropriation will not reduce the 
quantity of water under existing water rights. Id. 
To reach this determination the hearing officer engaged in the following analysis. First, 
he calculated that the Cooks are authorized to divert up to 2,187.7 acre-feet of water annually 
under their existing six water rights. id. at 49. Next, recognizing that the Cooks have never 
diverted that full volume, the hearing officer computed the Cooks' actual authorized historical 
use under the existing rights. Id. at 51-553. He examined the record to find which year in the 
last fifteen the Cooks diverted the most water. Id. His examination revealed that the highest 
water use occurred in 2012. Id. at 49-50. He recognized, and it is undisputed in the record, that 
the Cooks have historically withdrawn ground water at a higher rate of diversion than that 
authorized under their existing rights.4 Id. This made the hearing officer's task more difficult. 
However, the hearing officer took steps to account for the unauthorized diversion to make sure it 
did not work to the Cooks' advantage. Id. Importantly, he undertook the task of analyzing how 
much water the Cooks would have diverted in 2012 had they been limited to their authorized 
diversion rate of 5.13 cfs. Id. Had the Cooks been so limited, the hearing officer found they 
would have diverted 1,221 acre-feet of ground water in 2012. Id. at 53. 
3 The Coalition does not challenge the hearing officer's findings that the additional criteria set forth in Idaho Code 
42-203A(5) have been satisfied. 
4 The evidence in the record establishes that the Cooks were unaware that their historic water use was not consistent 
with their water rights until Spring 2014. Tr., p.12. Once they were aware, the Cooks filed the instant application 
for pennit in an attempt to address the issue. 
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Finally, the hearing officer determined that if the Cooks' new appropriation and existing 
water rights are limited to a combined annual diversion volume of 1,221 acre-feet, the new 
appropriation will be fully mitigated and will not reduce the quantity of water under existing 
water rights. Id. at 53. By so limiting the rights, he reasoned that "[t]he volume of water 
diverted under the proposed permit will be offset by a corresponding reduction in the volume 
pumped under the existing rights." Id. The Coalition argues that the hearing officer's findings in 
these respects are not supported by substantial evidence in the record and are contrary to law. 
Each will be addressed in tum. 
i. The hearing officer's findings pertaining to whether the proposed 
appropriation will reduce the quantity of water under existing water rights is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
The Coalition argues that the findings pertaining to whether the proposed appropriation 
will reduce the quantity of water under existing water rights are not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. It first asserts that the hearing officer's calculations of what the Cooks' 
water usage would have been in 2012 had they been limited to their authorized diversion rate are 
unsupported and must be disregarded. It asserts the data in the record only establishes the 
Cooks' historic water usage based on inflated and unauthorized diversion rates. This is true in a 
strict sense. The historic use data in the record reflects diversion rates by the Cooks that exceed 
that authorized under their rights. However, it is misplaced to insinuate that the hearing officer is 
incapable of evaluating the evidence and deducing, based on that evidence, what the Cooks' 
water usage would have been in 2012 had they been limited to their authorized diversion rate. 
The hearing officer, based on his experience and expertise, is certainly capable of engaging in 
such an undertaking. 5 
The Court finds that the hearing officer's calculations are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. The record includes data of the Cooks' actual water usage and power 
usage in 2012. Ex. I. This data was collected by the Department as part of its Water 
Management Information System. Id. It is the power usage data in which the hearing officer 
took particular interest. R., pp.52-53. From the data, he deduced that the Cooks used 1,466,800 
kWh of power in 2012. Id. The hearing officer calculated that power usage equated to 108 days 
5 Likewise, the experts retained by the parties, one of whom is an engineer and the other a hydrologist, are qualified 
of engaging in such an undertaking. 
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of pumping that year. Id. at 52. Then, the hearing officer added twelve days of pumping to the 
equation based on the testimony of Jeffrey Cook, who testified as to how irrigation practices 
would have been altered had they been limited to their authorized diversion rate of 5.13 cfs,. Id. 
at 52-53. He made the factual finding that had the Cooks been so limited, they would have 
pumped water for 120 days in 2012. Id. Utilizing the following equation, the hearing officer 
computed that had the Cooks diverted water for 120 days in 2012 at their authorized diversion 
rate, they would have diverted 1,221 acre-feet of water that year: "120 days *5.13 cfs = 6.15.6 
cfs-days * 1.9835 af/cfs-day = 1,221 acre-feet." Id. at 53. The Court finds the hearing officer's 
calculations to be supported by substantial evidence in the record. The evidence includes the 
record of the Cooks' preexisting water rights, historic water and power usage data collected via 
the Department's Water Management Information System, and the testimony of Jeffrey Cook. 
Ex. 103-108; Ex. 1; Tr., pp.22-27, 35-43, 132-140. 
The Coalition next asserts that the hearing officer's finding that the appropriation will not 
reduce the quantity of water under existing rights is unsupported by substantial evidence. This 
Court disagrees. The new appropriation authorizes the Cooks to divert water via their well at a 
higher rate of diversion than previously. However, the record establishes that the annual 
withdrawal of ground water from the aquifer will not increase as a result of the new 
appropriation. That such is the case is evidenced by the conditions placed on the appropriation 
by the hearing officer. Those conditions limit the Cooks' use of water under the new 
appropriation and their existing rights to "a total annual maximum diversion volume of 1,221 af 
at the field headgate." R., at 57. Since 1,221 acre-feet is what the Cooks' would have diverted 
historically under their existing rights had they been limited to their authorized rate of diversion, 
the new appropriation will not result in any more water being withdrawn from the aquifer on an 
annual basis than that which was already occurring. 
Notwithstanding, the Coalition argues that the new appropriation authorizes the Cooks to 
divert the volume of water authorized under their rights in a shorter amount of time, resulting in 
the reduction of the quantity of water under existing rights. This assertion is not supported by 
the record. As set forth above, substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's finding that 
the amount of water withdrawn from the aquifer on an a.11J1ual basis will not increase as a result 
of the new appropriation. Ex. 103-108; Ex. 1; Tr., pp.22-27, 35-43, 132-140. With respect to the 
fact that the water may be withdrawn in a shorter amount of time, the Coalition's ov.n expert 
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testified that the timing of withdrawal will not reduce the amount of water existing under the 
Coalition's water rights: 
Q. Okay. Back on IDWR Exhibit L Do you see that 2012 [the Cooks] 
pumped 1522 acre-feet? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And do you think that that's a -- well, let me ask this way. If that 
amount was pumped out very quickly or over a drawn-out period, does 
that increase the impacts aquiferwide? Would it hurt your clients any 
more or less than whether it was diverted more quickly or less quickly? 
A. I would say no. 
Tr., p.163.6 Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court finds the hearing officer's finding 
pertaining to whether the proposed appropriation will reduce the quantity of water under existing 
water rights to be supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
ii. The Preliminary Order is not contrary to law and must be affirmed. 
The Coalition argues that the Preliminary Order results in an enlarged diversion rate 
beyond the Cooks' existing water rights and therefore is contrary to law. As discussed above, an 
application for permit to appropriate water is evaluated against the criteria set forth in Idaho 
Code§ 42-203A. The hearing officer found that the Cooks' application satisfied all of the 
criteria set forth in that statute. On judicial review, the Coalition challenges only the hearing 
officer's findings that the proposed appropriation will not reduce the quantity of water under 
existing water rights. Since the hearing officer's finding on this criterion is supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, for the reasons set forth above, it will not be disturbed. Since 
all of the statutory criteria set forth in Idaho Code § 42-203A have been satisfied, the hearing 
officer's Preliminary Order issuing the permit is not contrary to law, but rather consistent with 
it. 
Notwithstanding, the Coalition argues that the Preliminary Order is inconsistent with 
prior precedent established by the Department In the Matter of Application to Appropriate Water 
6 As a general matter, withdrawing water at a faster rate without increasing the annual volume diverted has the 
potential to impact existing rights as a result of the expanded cone of depression. However, the record supports the 
hearing officer's finding that the Coalition's water rights would not be impacted. As concerns other existing rights, 
no other water right holders protested the application. 
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No. 27-12155 in the Name of the City of Shelley. In the City of Shelley matter, the City filed an 
application to appropriate ground water. Ex. 202, p. l. The Department found that without 
mitigation, the application would reduce the quantity of water under existing rights. Id. at 11. 
Among other forms of mitigation, the City proposed limiting the annual volume of water 
diverted under its existing rights and its new appropriation to that volume already authorized 
under its existing rights. Id. at 12-13. It is important to note that the City did not propose 
limiting the annual volume to that which it had actually diverted historically, but rather that total 
volume authorized under its existing rights. Id. The Department rejected the proposed 
mitigation on the grounds that new appropriation could still result in more water being diverted 
annually from the aquifer by the City than that which it has actually diverted historically.7 Id. 
The City of Shelley matter is distinguishable from the instant proceeding. In the City of 
Shelley matter, it was possible that the City could withdraw more water from the aquifer 
annually as a result of its proposed appropriation than it ever had historically. Such is not the 
case here. By placing appropriate limitations on his approval of the Cooks' application, the 
hearing officer assured that the Cooks' annual withdrawal of ground water from the aquifer as a 
result of the new appropriation will not exceed that which they have legally diverted historically. 
Last, the Court notes that the Department has implemented a moratorium restricting the 
processing and approval of new application for permits to appropriate water from ground water 
sources within the Eastern Snake Plain Area. Amended Moratorium Order (April 30, 1993). 
However, by its express terms, the Amended Moratorium Order does not prevent the Director 
from reviewing an application for permit if: 
The Director determines that the development and use of the water pursuant to an 
application will have no effect on prior surface and ground water rights because 
of its location, insignificant consumption of water or mitigation provided by the 
applicant to offset injury to other rights. 
Amended Moratorium Order, p.5. The hearing officer determined that if the Cooks' new 
appropriation and existing water rights are limited to a combined annual diversion volume of 
1,221 acre-feet, the new appropriation will be fully mitigated and will not reduce the quantity of 
water under existing water rights. Id. at 53. That is, "[t]he volume of water diverted under the 
proposed permit will be offset by a corresponding reduction in the volume pumped under the 
7 The Department ultimately approved the City of Shelley's application for pennit, albeit as a result of alternative 
fonns of mitigation proposed by the City not discussed here. 
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existing rights." Id. For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds the hearing officer's finding 
in this respect to be supported by substantial evidence in the record and will not be disturbed. 
In sum, the Court finds that the hearing officer's Preliminary Order is consistent with 
Idaho Code§ 42-203A, the Department's decision in the City of Shelley matter, and the 
Department's Amended Moratorium Order. It follows that the Coalition's argument that the 
Preliminary Order is contrary to law is unavailing. 
iii. The hearing officer's Preliminary Order is affirmed on the additional 
grounds that the Coalition has failed to establish its substantial rights have 
been prejudiced. 
Under Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4), a decision of the Department must be affirmed unless 
the petitioner can establish that its substantial rights have been prejudiced. In this case, it cannot 
be said that the Preliminary Order prejudices the Coalition's substantial rights. The Coalition 
holds senior natural flow and storage water rights on the Snake River. However, as set forth 
above, the evidence in the record establishes that the Cooks' annual withdrawal of ground water 
from the aquifer will not increase as a result of the new appropriation. Nor will the fact that the 
water may be withdrawn in a shorter amount of time impact the Coalition's rights. Tr., p.163. 
Therefore, the Coalition has failed to establish that its water rights are prejudiced by the Final 
Order. 
B. The Cooks' argument that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the 
Petition for Judicial Review is inconsistent with IDAP A. 
The Cooks' assert the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Coalition's Petition 
for Judical Review on the grounds that the Coalition failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies. They argue the Coalition was required to motion the Director to review the hearing 
officer's Preliminary Order prior to seeking judicial review of that Order. This Court disagrees. 
IDAP A provides that either an agency head, or someone other than the agency head (i.e., 
a hearing officer), may preside over a contested case proceeding before an agency. LC. § 67-
5242(2). Where someone other than the agency head acts as the presiding officer, he may issue 
one of two types of orders. LC. § 67-5243. He may issue a recommended order, which becomes 
a final order of the agency only after review by the agency head. I.C. § 67-5243(1 )(a). Or, he 
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may issue a preliminary order which becomes a final order of the agency unless the agency head, 
on its own motion or upon motion of a party, reviews it. LC. §§ 67-5243(1 )(b) & 67-5246(3). In 
this case, the hearing officer, who was not the agency head, issued a Preliminary Order. The 
record reflects that the Director did not review the Preliminary Order on his own motion, nor did 
any party timely motion him to so review the Order. Therefore, the Preliminary Order 
subsequently became a final order of the Department via operation oflaw. LC. §§ 67-5243(l)(b) 
& 67-5246(3). 
The Cooks' argument that the Preliminary Order is not subject to judicial review is 
inconsistent with IDAPA. Idaho Code§ 67-5270 sets forth the requirement that an agency 
action must be "final" before judicial review is available. Idaho Code § 67-5271 (1) sets forth the 
concomitant requirement that judicial review may not be sought by an individual until he "has 
exhausted all administrative remedies required in this chapter." I.C. § 67-5271(1). These two 
provisions go hand in hand. When read together they establish the general principle that a 
person may not seek judicial review of an agency action before the administrative process has 
finished. The agency process in this case finished once the hearing officer's Preliminary Order 
became a final order of the Department via operation of law. Hence, this is not a situation where 
the Coalition is attempting to seek judicial review prior to the agency completing its 
administrative process. 
The Cooks' argument is also contrary to the plain language ofldaho Code § 67-5273(2). 
That statute provides that a petition for judicial review of"a preliminary order that has become 
final when it was not reviewed by the agency head ... must be filed within twenty-eight (28) 
days of the ... date when the preliminary order became final. ... " LC.§ 67-5273(2) (emphasis 
added). Contrary to the Cooks' argument, the plain language of this statute expressly 
acknowledges that a party may seek judicial review of a preliminary order that has become final 
when it was not reviewed by the agency head. The Cooks' position renders the plain language of 
this statute meaningless and must be rejected. See e.g .. Brown v. Caldwell School Dist. No. 132, 
127 Idaho 112, 117, 88 P.2d 43, 48 (1995) (setting forth rule of statutory construction that a 
statute should be interpreted so as to give effect to all of its language, and that courts do not 
presume that t.'1e legislature performed an idle act by using meaningless statutory language). 
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IV. 
ORDER 
Therefore, based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Preliminary Order Issuing 
Permit issued on May 15, 2015 is hereby affirmed, 
DatedD,ce~,\iL-c I"-! 2015 ~~ 
~iiLD~N--
District Judge 
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I. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. On June 8, 2012, the Black Canyon Irrigation District, New York Irrigation 
District, Pioneer Irrigation District, Nampa-Meridian Irrigation District and the Boise Project 
Board of Control filed a Petition pursuant to SRBA Administrative Order I, Rules of Procedure, 
§ 16, requesting that the Court designate the following issue as a basin-wide issue in the Snake 
River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA"): "Does Idaho law require a remark authorizing storage 
rights to 'refill' space vacated for flood control?" 
2. Parties to the SRBA were provided notice of the Petition pursuant to Docket Sheet 
procedure and were given the opportunity to participate in the proceedings. 
3. On September 21, 2012, following hearing, the Court entered an Order designating 
the following issue as Basin-Wide Issue 17: "Does Idaho law require a remark authorizing 
storage rights to 'refill,' under priority, space vacated for flood control." Thereafter, the parties 
to the proceeding were given the chance to submit briefing. 
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4. Opening briefs were filed by the following parties: (I) the Idaho Power Company; 
(2) the United States Bureau of Reclamation; (3) the State of Idaho; (4) the Pioneer Irrigation 
District; (5) the Boise Project Board of Control and New York Irrigation District (collectively, 
"'Boise Project"); (6) the Fremont-Madison Irrigation District, Blackfoot Irrigation District and 
Idaho Irrigation District (collectively, "Upper Valley Water Users"); (7) the American Falls 
Reservoir District No. 2, A&B Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation 
District, Minidoka Irrigation District, North Side Canal Company and Twin Falls Canal 
Company (collectively, "Surface Water Coalition"); and (8) the Ballentyne Ditch Company, 
Boise Valley Irrigation Ditch Company, Canyon County Water Company, Eureka Water 
Company, Farmers' Co-operative Ditch Company, Middleton Mill Ditch Company, Middleton 
Irrigation Association, Inc., Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District, New Dry Creek Ditch 
Company, Pioneer Ditch Company, Settlers Irrigation District, South Boise Water Company and 
Thurman Mill Ditch Company (collectively, "Ditch Companies"). 
5. Response briefs were filed by the following parties: (I) the Idaho Power Company; 
(2) the United States Bureau of Reclamation; (3) the State ofldaho; (4) the Pioneer Irrigation 
District; (5) the Boise Project; (6) the Surface Water Coalition; (7) the Ditch Companies; and (8) 
United Water Idaho, Inc. 
6. Reply briefs were filed by the following parties: ( 1) the Idaho Power Company; 
(2) the State ofldaho; (3) the Pioneer Irrigation District; ( 4) the Boise Project; ( 5) the Surface 
Water Coalition; and (6) the Ditch Companies. 
7. The City of Pocatello did not file briefing, but did file a Statement joining in the 
positions taken by the State ofldaho and the Upper Valley Water Users. 
8. Oral argument on Basin-Wide Issue I 7 was heard before this Court on February 
12, 2013. The parties did not request additional briefing, nor does the Court require any. The 
matter is therefore deemed fuJly submitted the following business day, or February 13, 2013. 
II. 
ISSUE 
Does Idaho law require a remark authorizing storage rights to "refill," under priority, 
space vacated for flood control? 
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III. 
BACKGROUND BEHIND DESIGNATION OF BASIN-WIDE ISSUE 17 
Basin-Wide Issue 17 arose out of two contested subcases in Basin O 1 : subcase nos. 01 
2064 and 01-2086. Those subcases concern storage water rights claimed in the SRBA by the 
United States Bureau of Reclamation in American Falls and Palisades Reservoirs respectively. 
In his Director's Report, Reporting Area Basin OJ, JDWR Part 2, filed on December 19, 2006, 
the Director recommended the water right claims in the name of the United States with the 
following elements: 
Right Source Quantity Priority Purpose Period of Use 
01-2064 Snake River 1,672,590.00 afy 03/30/1921 Irrigation Storage (l.628,316.00 afy) 01/01 - 12/31 
Irrigation from Storage (1,628,316.00 afy) 03/15 - 11/15 
Power Storage (295.163.00 afy) 01/01 - 12/31 
Power from Storage {295,163.00 afy) 01/0] - 12/31 
01-2068 Snake River 1,200,000.00 afy 07/28/1939 Irrigation Storage (1,200,000.00 a(y) 01/01 12/31 
Irrigation from Storage ( U00,000.00 afy) 03/15 - ll/15 
Power Storage (1,200.000 00 afy) 01101 - 12/31 
Power from Storage (1,200,000.00 afy) 01/01 12/31 
The United States subsequently filed Objections, asserting that the Director's recommendations 
should be amended to include the following remark under the quantity element: "This water right 
includes the right to refill under the priority date of this water right to satisfy the United States' 
storage contracts." United States' Standard Form 1 Objection, Subcase Nos. 01-2064 & Ol-
2068 (April 19, 2007). 
The State of Idaho, which filed Responses to the Objections, disagreed with the United 
States' proposed storage refill remark. It proffered the following alternative remark to be placed 
on the face of the two water rights, arguing that it more accurately reflects Idaho law on storage 
refill: 
This right is filled for a given irrigation season when the total quantity of water 
that has been accumulated to storage under this right equals the decreed quantity. 
Additional water may be stored under this right but such additional storage is 
incidental and subordinate to all existing and future water rights. 
State's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Subcase Nos. 01-2064 & 01-2068 (January 25, 
2012). As a result of the remarks proposed by the United States and the State, a dispute arose in 
subcase nos. 01-2064 and 01-2068 over the state ofldaho law regarding the ability of a storage 
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water right holder to refill, under priority, water diverted and stored pursuant to a valid storage 
water right but which was used by the reservoir operator for flood control purposes. 
As the parties to subcase nos. 01-2064 and 01-2068 litigated the issue within the confines 
of those subcases, other parties in the SRBA who are storage water right holders and/or reservoir 
spaceholders began to take note of the Basin 01 proceedings. Concerned over the ramifications 
the two subcases might have on their respective storage water rights, a group of interested parties 
filed the Petition to Designate Basin-Wide Issue with this Court. The Petition argued that the 
state of Idaho law as it pertains to the ability to refill, under priority, stored reservoir water 
vacated for flood control purposes is an issue of basin-wide significance.' After the Court 
entered its Order designating Basin-Wide Issue 17, subcase nos. 01-2064 and O 1-2068 were 




Whether Idaho law requires a remark authorizing storage rights to "refill," under priority, 
space vacated for flood control is an issue of first impression. Resolution of the issue requires an 
analysis of the nature of storage water rights under the doctrine of prior appropriation as 
established in Idaho. 
A. Nature of storage water rights. 
Idaho law recognizes and provides for the appropriation of storage water rights. LC. § 
42-202. A storage water right entitles the appropriator to divert, impound and control water from 
a natural watercourse by means of a diversion structure such as a dam. The purpose of use 
element of a storage water right generally contains at least two authorized purposes of use. 2 The 
1 The remarks proposed and arguments set forth by the parties in subcase nos. 01-2064 and 01-2068 are not relevant 
to the instant basin-wide proceeding. Nor are the records from those subcases pertinent to this proceeding. The 
summary provided in Section III is included merely for context. 
2 This is not always the case. For instance, water right 63-3618 (storage water right for Lucky Peak Reservoir) 
includes a purpose of use for "Recreation Storage" which authorizes water to be stored, but does not contain a 
second associated purpose of use that the stored water be put to an end use. SRBA Subcase No. 63-3618, Partial 
Decree (Dec. 18, 2008}. 
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first authorizes the storage of water for a particular purpose (i.e., "irrigation storage;' or "power 
storage"). The second authorizes the subsequent use of that stored water for an associated 
purpose, which is referred to herein as the "end use" (i.e., "irrigation from storage, or "power 
from storage"). Each purpose of use is assigned its own quantity and period of use, which may 
or may not differ from one another.3 With respect to storage rights for irrigation, for example, it 
is typical for the "Irrigation Storage" purpose of use to be a year round use (01-0 I to 12-3 I), and 
the "Irrigation from Storage" purpose of use to be limited to the irrigation season (e.g., 03-15 to 
11-15). 
Water diverted and stored pursuant to a storage water right need not be put to the end use 
immediately, but may be stored for a period oftime prior to the end use: 
There is a fundamental difference with regard to the diversion and use of water 
from a flowing stream and a reservoir. In a stream if a user does not take out his 
water, it may be diverted by the other appropriators, because otherwise it flows on 
and is dissipated. But the very purpose of storage is to retain and hold for 
subsequent use, direct or augmentary, hence retention is not of itself illegal nor 
does it deprive the user of the right to continue to hold. 
Rayl v. Salmon River Canal Co., 66 Idaho 199,208, 157 P.2d 76, 80 (1945). Under certain 
circumstances, a storage water right holder may even carry over water diverted and stored in a 
given year into subsequent years before it is put to the end use. See e.g .. Id. at 201, 157 P.2d at 
77 (stating, the practice of holding storage water over from one season to the next "has become 
too well entrenched in the concept of our water law both by practice and prior and subsequent 
precept to be ... denounced and forbidden"); IDAPA 37.03.11.042.01.g. (holder of a storage 
right shall be entitled to maintain a reasonable amount of carry-over storage to assure water 
supplies for future dry years). 
Under Idaho law, "[o]ne may acquire storage water rights and receive a vested priority 
date and quantity, just as with any other water right." American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. 
Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862,878, 154 P.3d 433,449 (2007); LC. § 42-202. 
Therefore, storage water rights are integrated into Idaho's prior appropriation doctrine on the 
basis of relative priority the same as other water rights. Once water is diverted and stored in a 
reservoir pursuant to a storage water right, it is no longer subject to diversion and appropriation, 
3 See e.g., the Director's recommended purpose of use element for storage water right claims 01-2064 and 01-2068, 
as set forth above in Section III. 
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but becomes property of the appropriators and owners of the reservoir. Washington County Irr. 
Dist. v. Talboy, 55 Idaho 382, 389, 43 P.2d 943, 945 ( 1935).4 It follows that no one can make an 
appropriation from a reservoir '·for the obvious reason that the waters so stored or conveyed are 
already diverted and appropriated .... " Id. at 389, 43 P.2d at 946. 
Ownership of storage water rights has some unique characteristics. In some instances, 
the reservoir operator may own the storage water rights associated with a reservoir. In other 
instances, the reservoir operator may not. In the case of federal Reclamation Act reservoirs, the 
reservoir operator, the United States Bureau of Reclamation, holds the storage water rights 
associated with the reservoir in name, but title to the use of the water is held by the consumers or 
users of the water. U.S. v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, J 57 P.3d 600 (2007). However, for 
the purpose of this Court's "refill" analysis, the distinctions between who operates the reservoir 
and who holds the storage water rights associated with the reservoir are distinctions without a 
difference. 
B. Under the doctrine of prior appropriation as established by Idaho law, a senior 
storage water right holder may not "refill" his storage water right under priority 
before affected junior appropriators satisfy their water rights once. 
A conflict exists in many of the reservoirs represented in this proceeding between water 
used by a reservoir operator for flood control purposes and water diverted and stored by storage 
right holders for all other purposes. The parties assert and recognize circumstances where water 
that has been diverted and stored in a reservoir pursuant to a valid storage right is used by the 
reservoir operator for flood control purposes before it is put to the authorized end use by the right 
holder. This is particularly problematic in reservoirs where there is an absence of any water right 
identifying "flood control" as an authorized purpose of use. 5 In such instances, the entire storage 
capacity of the reservoir may be allocated via the issuance of storage water rights to water 
appropriated for other uses, such as "irrigation storage and irrigation from storage." When a 
reservoir operator uses stored water for flood control purposes in such a reservoir he is using 
4 A Storage right is still subject to other requirements of the prior appropriation doctrLne. American Falls Reservoir 
Dist. No. 2, at 879, 154 P.3d at 450. 
5 A review of the water rights associated with the reservoirs represented in this proceeding reveal that it is most 
often the case, if not unanimously the case, that no water right exists associated with these reservoirs that identify 
"flood control" as an authorized purpose of use. 
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water that was stored by a storage water right holder under state law for some other authorized 
purpose. The question presented to this Court is whether Idaho law permits a storage water right 
holder to "refill" that water used for flood control purposes under the priority of his storage right. 
The significance of this issue is understood in the reality that such priority refill may necessitate 
delivery calls and the curtailment of junior appropriators. Also, the fill in the first place may 
have occurred at the expense of juniors (i.e., in the instance where juniors are not allowed to use 
their water rights while the senior storage right is filling). 
The parties have coalesced into two groups based on how they answer the subject 
question. The first group, referred to herein collectively as the "Petitioners'', includes the Idaho 
Power Company, the United States, the Boise Project, the Surface Water Coalition, and the Ditch 
Companies. The Petitioners assert that Idaho law permits a storage right holder to refill his 
storage right, under priority, when water diverted and stored under that right is used by the 
reservoir operator for flood control purposes. They assert the right to priority refill is inherent in 
the nature of a storage water right. Since they assert this is the state of Idaho law, it is their 
position that no remark is necessary on the face of a storage right to authorize such priority refill. 
The Petitioners contend that a storage right holder is entitled to put to the storage right's end use 
that volume of water set forth in the quantity element of the right. If water diverted and stored 
under a storage right is used for flood control purposes by the reservoir operator, then it is the 
Petitioners' position that the storage holder is entitled to refill that space, under priority, to 
ensure a sufficient quantity of storage water to complete the right's end use. 
The second group, referred to herein collectively as the "Objectors," includes the State of 
Idaho, the Upper Valley Water Users, United Water Idaho, Inc., and the City of Pocatello. The 
Objectors assert that allowing a storage right holder to refill a storage water right under priority 
where water diverted and stored pursuant to that right is used by the reservoir operator for flood 
control purposes is contrary to Idaho's doctrine of prior appropriation. Specifically, they assert 
that priority refill would (1) unlawfully result in an un-quantified water right, (2) constitute an 
unlawful enlargement of the storage water right, and (3) conflict with the requirement of 
maximizing beneficial use and minimizing waste of water. Therefore, the Objectors contend that 
a.riy remark that authorizes storage refill, under the priority of the storage right, in excess of the 
licensed or decreed quantity would be contrary to Idaho law. 
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The term "refill" is not a legal term of art under Idaho law, but its common meaning is 
"to fill again." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, p.1467 (4th ed., 
2000). The term "fill" means to "to satisfy or meet." The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language, p.659 (4th ed., 2000). Thus, the question whether a storage water right may 
be ••refilled" under priority necessarily assumes that the storage water right has already been 
"filled" or satisfied once under priority as determined by the Department. The Court notes that 
the term "fill" may be used to describe (1) a reservoir physically filling with water, or (2) the 
decreed volume of a storage water right being satisfied (i.e. when the total quantity that has been 
accounted to storage equals the decreed quantity). The distinction between the two uses of the 
term is significant, as there may be situations where the storage water rights associated with a 
particular reservoir are considered filled or satisfied even though the reservoir has not physically 
filled with water. Many of the reservoirs implicated in this proceeding are administered as a 
unified system where storage space can be exchanged between reservoirs within the system. For 
example, Palisades Reservoir can be holding and storing water that is decreed to American Falls 
Reservoir. As a result, the storage water rights in a reservoir may be considered filled or 
satisfied even though available space may exist in the reservoir to which the right was decreed. 
Further, many storage right holders also hold natural flow rights that are used in conjunction with 
their storage rights.6 For the purposes of this opinion, the term "fill" or "filled" is used to 
describe the decreed volume of a storage water right being satisfied. 
The assertion that a senior storage right holder can "fill," or ''satisfy," his water right 
multiple times under priority before an affected junior water right is satisfied once is contrary to 
the prior appropriation doctrine as established under Idaho law. Idaho's prior appropriation 
doctrine provides protections to both senior and junior appropriators through a system of priority 
administration. A senior appropriator's water right is protected under the doctrine against 
interference from those whose rights are subsequent in priority. See e.g., Idaho Const., Art XV, 
§ 3 (providing "[p ]riority of appropriations shall give the better right as between those using the 
water"); LC. § 42-106 ("As between appropriators, the first in time is first in right"). At the 
same time, a junior appropriator's water right is protected against wrongful acts on the part of 
6 Accordingly, the Department utilizes an accounting methodology for the purpose of detennining when a storage 
water right has been "filled." The methodologies employed by the Department for determining when a right has 
been filled are beyond the scope of these proceedings. In the Order designating the basin-wide issue this Court 
detennined that the Department's accounting methodology is an administrative function which should be addressed 
on a case-by-case basis on a fully developed factual record and where the Department is a party to the proceeding. 
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senior appropriators that would disturb the junior's right to the use of water. See e.g., Van Camp 
v. Emery, 13 Idaho 202,208, 89 P. 754 ( 1907) (providing that a senior may divert the 
quantity to which he is entitled, but once he has done so he may not impede a junior from 
receiving the water to which the junior is entitled). One leading scholar sets forth the proposition 
in the following terms: 
The junior appropriator . . . is entitled to protection not only against those whose 
rights are subsequent to his, but also against wrongful acts on the part of earlier 
appropriators. That is to say, while an appropriator may divert the quantity of 
water to which he is entitled, when he has once done so he may not so impede the 
flow of the remaining stream as to prevent it from reaching the junior 
appropriator's headgate. 
Wells A. Hutchins, The Idaho Law of Water Rights, 5 Idaho L Rev. 1, 50 (1968). 
Storage water rights are integrated into Idaho's prior appropriation doctrine on the basis 
of relative priority the same as other water rights. American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2, 143 
Idaho at 878, 154 P.3d at 449; LC.§ 42-202. As soon as a senior storage right is filled it is no 
longer in priority. Allowing a storage right holder to refill his right under priority after his right 
is filled, but before affected junior right holders are satisfied, is impermissible as it would 
wrongfully disturb the junior appropriators' rights to the use of water, Van Camp v. Emery, 13 
Idaho at 208 89 P. at 754, and would diminish the junior right holders' priorities. See e.g., 
Jenkins v. State Dept. qf Water Resources, 103 Idaho 384,388,647 P.2d 1256, 1260 (providing, 
"[p]riority in time is an essential part of western water law and to diminish one's priority works 
an undeniable injury to that water right holder"). Simply stated, under Idaho's doctrine of prior 
appropriation a senior storage holder may not fill or satisfy his water right multiple times, under 
priority, before rights held by affected junior appropriators are satisfied once. A remark 
authorizing such priority refill would be contrary to Idaho law. The fact that water diverted and 
stored pursuant to a valid storage water right is used by the reservoir operator for flood control 
purposes does not alter the above analysis, assuming, as the term "refill" necessarily implies, the 
storage right has already been filled once during the period <?fuse under priority.7 
7 The Court notes that since this issue has arisen some reservoir storage right holders have filed motions to file late 
claims for separate beneficial use rights to address refill. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION - l O -
S:\ORDERS\Basin Wide lssues\Basin-Wide Issue 17\Memorandum Dccision.docx 
C. This basin-wide proceeding does not address the issue of when the quantity element 
of a storage water right is rightfully considered to be "filled" or "satisfied." 
Approaching the issue from the perspective of priority refill of a storage water right, 
which assumes a priority fill of that right has already occurred, misses the mark. It is the 
quantity element of a water right that defines the duration of priority administration during its 
authorized period of use. Thus, the more important issue pertains to when the quantity element 
of a storage right is considered filled. Namely, is water that is diverted and stored under a 
storage right counted towards the quantity of that right if it is used by the reservoir operator for 
flood control purposes? That is an accounting issue which this basin-wide proceeding does not 
address.8 
As explained in the Order Designating Basin-Wide Issue, the issue of when a storage 
water right is filled does not lend itself to a basin-wide proceeding, and is not before the Court 
here. As an initial matter, addressing the issue of fill may require factual inquiries, investigation 
and record development specific to a given reservoir and the water right or rights associated with 
the reservoir. Addressing the issue of fill will require a record as to how the Department 
accounts for fill in each individual reservoir under its accounting methodology. Such fact 
specific inquiries do not lend themselves to review in a basin-wide proceeding. 
Furthennore, the authority and responsibility for measuring and distributing water to and 
among appropriators is statutorily conferred to, and vested in, the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources and its Director. Idaho Code § 42-103 provides that "it shall be the duty of the 
department of water resources to devise a simple, unifonn system for the measurement and 
distribution of water." Chapter 6, Title 42 of the Idaho Code governs the "distribution of water 
among appropriators" and directs that the Director and the watermasters under his supervision 
are statutorily charged with distributing water to water rights. In particular, Idaho Code § 42-602 
vests in the Director, the "direction and control of the distribution of water from all natural water 
sources within a water district to canals, ditches, pumps and other facilities diverting therefrom." 
Similarly, Idaho Code§ 42-603 instructs that the Director is "authorized to adopt rules and 
regulations for the distribution of water from the streams, rivers, lakes, ground water and other 
8 The Court also notes that this basin-wide proceeding does not address claims (contractual, statutory, constitutional 
or otherwise), if any, a storage right holder or reservoir spaceholder may have against a reservoir operator where the 
reservoir operator uses water diverted and stored by that storage right holder or spaceholder for flood control 
purposes. 
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natural water sources as shall be necessary to carry out the laws in accordance with the priorities 
of the rights of the users thereof." 
The Director has the authority and discretion to determine how water from a natural 
water source is distributed to storage water rights pursuant to accounting methodologies he 
employs. The Director's discretion in this respect is not unbridled, but rather is subject to state 
law and oversight by the courts. See American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2. 143 Idaho at 880, 154 
P.3d at 451 (addressing court oversight on a properly developed record). When review of the 
Director's discretion in this respect is brought before the courts in an appropriate proceeding, and 
upon a properly developed record, the courts can determine whether the Director has properly 
exercised his discretion regarding accounting methodologies. 
D. This basin-wide proceeding does not address pursuant to what state law authority 
water that is diverted and stored pursuant to a valid storage water right is used 
for flood control purposes by the reservoir operator where no water right exists 
authorizing that use. 
Idaho state law directs that "[ n ]o person shalJ divert any water from a natural watercourse 
or apply water to land without having obtained a valid water right to do so, or apply it to 
purposesfor which no valid water right exists.'' I.C. § 42-201(2) (emphasis added). That statute 
recognizes only two exceptions to this rule: (l) water used to extinguish or prevent the spread of 
an existing fire, and (2) water used for forest practices as defined in section 38-1303( I), Idaho 
Code, and forest dust abatement. I.C. § 42-201(3). The statute does not create an exception for 
flood control purposes. To the contrary, Idaho law recognizes that an appropriator may file an 
application with the Department to "appropriate and store flood ... waters."9 I.C. § 42-202(3). 
However, the parties to this subcase did not address pursuant to what state authority water that is 
diverted and stored pursuant to a valid storage water right is used for flood control purposes by 
the reservoir operator (in either a federal or non-federal reservoir) where no water right exists 
under state law authorizing such use. Therefore the Court does not reach that issue. Likewise, 
whether or not federal Jaw authorizes the use of storage water for flood control purposes in 
9 The statute does not define "flood water." However, in the context of water law the term has been used 
interchangeably with "excess water" and used to describe the circumstance where water in the system at a given 
time exceeds the quantity necessary to satisfy existing non-flood rights on the system. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION · 12 -
S:\ORDERS\Basin Wide lssues\Basin• Wide Issue 17\Memorandum Decision.docx 
federal reservoirs without a valid state water right or otherwise supersedes state law for this 
particular purpose is beyond the scope of this basin-wide issue. 10 
E. The Petitioners' reliance on state law providing that there can be no forfeiture if a 
water right bolder is prevented from exercising his right by circumstances over 
which he has no control is misplaced. 
In support of the argument that state law allows a storage right holder to refill his storage 
right, under priority, when water diverted and stored under that right is used by the reservoir 
operator for flood control purposes, the Petitioners cite to Idaho Code§ 42-223(6). That statute 
sets forth defenses to forfeiture and provides in part that "no portion of any water right shall be 
lost or forfeited for nonuse if the nonuse results from circumstances over which the water right 
owner has no control." LC.§ 42-223(6). The Petitioners assert that in a reservoir where the 
storage water right holder or spaceholder is not the reservoir operator, the storage right holder or 
spaceholder has no control over the reservoir operator's use of stored water for flood control. 
However, this basin-wide proceeding does not deal with the forfeiture of storage water rights, 
and no assertion has been made that storage water rights are forfeited when water diverted and 
stored under a storage right is used for flood control purposes. Rather this proceeding is limited 
to whether Idaho law requires a remark authorizing storage rights to "refill," under priority, 
space vacated for flood control. That issue is addressed by this Order. Therefore, the statute on 
which Petitioners' rely is not applicable here. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court holds that under the prior appropriation doctrine as established under Idaho 
law, a senior storage water right holder may not refill his storage water right under priority 
before junior appropriators satisfy their water rights once. A remark authorizing such priority 
refill would be contrary to Idaho law. The fact that water diverted a.tJ.d stored pursuant to a valid 
storage water right is used by the reservoir operator for flood control purposes does not alter this 
analysis, assuming, as the term "refill" necessarily implies, the storage right has been filled 
10 With respect to federal reclamation act reservoirs, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "federal law defers to 
state law in detennining the rights to water in the reclamation projects," and that "the [Reclamation] Act clearly 
provided that state water law would control in the appropriation and later distribution of the water." U.S. v. Pioneer 
Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 110, 157 P.3d 600,604 (2007). 
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once during the period of use under priority. The Court does not address the issue of whether 
water that is diverted and stored under a storage right is rightfully accounted towards the quantity 
of that right if it is used by the reservoir operator for flood control purposes. That issue is 
beyond the scope of this basin-wide proceeding and not before the Court here. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Presiding Judge 
Snake River Basin Adjudication 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is 
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby 
direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may 
issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
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L 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
l. This matter concerns certain water rights claimed in the Snake River Basin 
Adjudication ( .. SRBA"') by the Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Company (''ASCC'). 
2. On June 23, 1999. the Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources ( .. IDWR"' or "Director") filed his Director ·s Reportfc>r lrriRation unJ Other 
Uses. Reporting Area 5 (JDWR Basin 35). recommending water rights 35-2543 and 35-
4246 in the name of the ASCC. 
3. On l\1ay 15. 2006. IDWR filed its Director's Report. Irrigation ond Other 
Uses, JDWR Lower Basin 01. recommending water rights 01-23B and 01-297 in the name 
of the ASCC. 
4. The water rights were recommended by the Director with the following 
elements: 
5. The Director recommended that the following remark be included under 
the quantity and place of use elements of water rights 01-23B and 01-297: .. Diversion of 
rights O 1-23 B and O 1-297 for the purpose of recharge for irrigation is authorized for a 
maximum of 501.8 cfs / 2 L094 acres ... 
6. Also with respect to water rights O l-23B and 01-297 the Director included 
a remark in the recommendation that stated: --Right includes accomplished change in 
purpose of use pursuant to Section 42-J 425. Idaho Code ... 
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7. Various Ohjections to the recommendations the above-captioned water 
rights were subsequently filed. These initial Ohjection.1· were subsequently resolved 
the filing of a Stipulation 10 Resolre Ohjection. 1 
8. On June 21. 2007. the ASCC was granted leave to amend its claims for the 
above-captioned water rights "'to more accurately [identify) the place of use resulting in a 
larger number of acres than originally claimed." 
9. On March 25. 2008. IDWR filed Amended Director ·s Reports for the 
above-captioned claims in response to the amended claims. The above-captioned water 
rights were recommended by the Director in the Amended Director's Reports with the 
following elements: 
I Right Source Purpose aud Period of lise 
i Ol-2Jll Irrigation (O-l/01- 10/.11) 
Rcchargr for irrigation (04/(J I - I (l/3 J) 
01-297 I Snake R in:r 
I 
Irrigation (O-l/0 I - I 0/31) 
Ciroundwatcr Irrigation ( 04/0 I - I IJ.iJ I) 
lmgation(IJ4i01 I0/31 i 
Quantity 
! 1.172 I els 






6 011 c1s I ox107119:ix 
2.5-l 7 1111 al\ i 
2.44 els j I 0/15/ 193-l 
Place of l se 
I (1 I. 7P .(, acre, 
' 
j 6 I. 772 (1 acre, 
61. 772.6 acre, 
'----~-----L-------------'--=1"=5:,""(""m""a=fl~-'-1 ____ _,_ ______ '-
10. The Director recommended that the following remark be included under 
the place of use element of \vater right O l-23B: "Diversion of this right for the purpose of 
recharge for irrigation is authorized for a maximum of 17.16 J .6 acres." 
JI. Consistent with the original Direcror 's Reports. the Amended Director ·.1 
Reports for water rights O J-23B and 01-297 included a remark in the recommendation 
that stated: "'Right includes accomplished change in purpose of use pursuant to Section 
42-1425. Idaho Code:· 
12. On April 28. 2008. the A&B Irrigation District Burley Irrigation District, 
Milner Irrigation District Minidoka Irrigation District American Falls Reservoir District 
#2. Twin Falls Canal Company. and North Side Canal Company (collectively the 
"'Surface Water Coalition" or "SWC") filed Ohicctions to the Director's amended 
recommendations for water right claims O l-23B and O 1-297. o~jecting to priority date. 
purpose of use. place of use and remarks. 
1 Ohjections to the initial recommendations were made by the United States Bureau of Reclamation and the 
United States Bureau of Land Management. objecting to the place of use element. A Srip11/a1iu11 tu Re.10/i-e 
Ohjection was subsequently filed resolving these ()hjedions. 
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13. Also on April 28. 2008. all the members of the SWC. less the Minidoka 
Jrrigation District filed Objections to the Director's amended recommendations for water 
right claims 35-2543 and 35-4246. objecting to place of use and remarks. 
l 4. On July 16. 2008. the Special Master entered an Order permitting the 
State of Idaho to file Lore Reponses to the Objections filed in each of the above-captioned 
subcases. The State of Idaho subsequently filed Late Reponses in all four subcases. 
15. On March 26, 2009, the ASCC filed a Jvforionfor Summary Judgment 
along with supporting documents in all four of the above-captioned subcases. requesting 
an order granting a partial decree for each water right be issued consistent with the 
recommendations in the Amended Director ·s Reports. 
16. On March 27. 2009. the SWC filed a lv!otionfi;r S'ummory .Judgment along 
with supporting documents in subcase Ol-23B. The SWC argued that water right 01 B 
cannot include a ··recharge for irrigation·· purpose of use as a matter oflaw. and that the 
.. recharge for_ irrigation" purpose of use should be dismissed. 
17. The State of Idaho filed its Brhfin Response to the Summary Judgment 
Motions in all four subcases on April 16. 2009. The State·s brief identified the primary 
issue in the subcases as whether the Director·s amended recommendation for water right 
OJ-23B correctly included --recharge for irrigation .. as a purpose of use. 
18. The SWC filed its Response to the ASCCs MotionfcJr Summory 
Judgment on April 16. 2009, and the ASCC filed its Response Brie/on April 17. 2009 in 
subcase Ol-23B. The SWC filed its Reply in subcase 01-23B on April 23. 2009. The 
ASCC filed its Reply on May 4. 2009. 
19. On June 11. 2009. the Special Master entered an Order I'orfially Cwnting 
A herdeen-Springfield ·s Mot ionjc;r S11111mw]' Jui~f!.menf cmd Denying S'wfuce TVctt er 
Coo/ii ion ·s Motionj(;r S'ummwJ' Judgment ond Motion to Strike Affidarils. holding that 
ASCC is entitled to pa11ial summary judgment as a matter oflaw in subcases 01-23 Band 
01-297. In that Order. the Special Master concluded that (1) recharge for irrigation was 
recognized as a beneficial use of water before the enactment of the groundwater recharge 
statute in I 978. and (2) a portion of the ASCC"s diversion from the Snake River decreed 
.. for irrigation and other purposes .. in water right Ol-23B was lawfully changed to 
.. recharge for irrigation·· with a priority date of February 6. 1895. 
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20. In addition. the Special Master found that remanding the matter to the 
IDWR Director under Idaho Code~ would only serve to delay resolution of the 
claim because the Director has already filed his report with his findings and conclusions 
in the form of his Amended Director ·s Report. He further found that remand was 
unnecessary because the SWC offered no evidence of injury or enlargement of the 
diversion due to the transfer. 
21. On January 8. 2010. the Special Master entered an Order denying a 
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the S WC. On August 31. 20 I 0. the Special Master 
entered an Order denying a Motion to Alter or Amend filed by the SWC. 
22. On April 23. 20 l 0. the Special Master entered a SJJecia/ Master ·s Report 
in subcases O l-23B and O 1-297. 
The SWC timely filed a Notice ofCho!lenge ,.vith this Court challenging 
the Special Master's Special Master Report and his Order Denying Joint Motion to Alter 
or Amend. 
11. 
MATTER DEEMED FlLLY SUBMITTED FOR DECISION 
Argument \Vas heard on January 18. 2011. The parties did not request additional 
briefing. nor does the Court require any. The matter is therefore deemed fully submitted 
the follov,ing business day. or January 19. 2011. 
Ill. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court is required to adopt a Special Master"s findings of fact unless they 
are clearly en-oneous. 1.R.C.P. 53(e)(2): Rodriguez,,. Oakley Valley Stone. Inc. 120 
Idaho 370. 377. 816 P.2d 326. 333 ( 1991 ). In determining whether findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous. a reviewing court ··inquires whether the findings of fact are supported 
by substantial and competent evidence:· Gil/ r. Viebrock. 125 Idaho 948. 951. 877 P.2d 
919. 922 ( 1994 ). The party challenging the findings of fact has the burden of showing 
error. and a reviewing court will review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CHALLENGE - 5 -
S IORDERSl(.'t,alil1on Clrnlkng.c - i\hcrdccn Spring.field Cmial Cn\!Vkmoramlum lkcic;1nn and< lrdcr.dllc 
prevailing party. SRBA SJ7rings & Fo1111toi11s Memorandum Decision & Order on 
Challenge. Subcase No. 67-13701 (July 28. 2006). p. 18. 
The Special Master·s conclusions of la\v. hO\vever. are not binding upon a 
reviewing cou11. although they are expected to be persuasive. Higley 1·. Woodard. 124 
Idaho 531. 534. 861 P.2d lOL 104 (Ct. App. 1993). This permits the district court to 
adopt the Special Master" s conclusions of !av, only to the extent they correctly state the 
law. 1d Accordingly. a reviewing court's standard of review of the Special Master's 
conclusions of law is one of free revie\,V. Id. 
IV. 
ISSUES RAISED ON CHALLENGE 
1. Whether the Special Master erred in recommending a ··recharge for 
irrigation'' purpose of use which is contrary to the purpose of use previously decreed for 
the water right? 
1 Whether the Special /\faster erred in recommending a purpose of use of 
··recharge for irrigation" \Vith a priority of 1895 when "recharge" was not a statutorily 
recognized beneficial use 111 Idaho until at least 1978? 
3. Whether there are sufficient facts in the record to support the finding that 
ASCC changed the nature of a portion of its diversion from "irrigation" to ··recharge for 
irrigation" at a time prior to November 19. 1987. as required by Idaho Code § 42-J 425. in 
order to avoid the requirements of Idaho Code~ 42-222? 
4. Whether the Special Master erred by declining to remand water right OJ -
23B to IDWR under Idaho Code § 42-1425? 
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V. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Factual Background. 
The Ol-23B claim is the only water right claim at issue in this case. Historical 
background surrounding the use of ASCC" s rights is necessary for context. ASCC is a 
Carey Act canal company that provides water to 486 shareholders within its service area 
for the irrigation of 6 L 722.6 total acres. Water is de! i vered through ,vater right O 1-23 B. 
01-297. 35-2543 and 35-4246. Water right claim 01-23B is a surface right diverted from 
the Snake River. The right authorizes the diversion of 1.172.1 cfs and the place of use is 
the entire 61.722.6 acres. The right was originally decreed on December 19. 1910. (as 
part of a larger right) in the Rexhurg Irrigation ( 'om puny et. of. ,,. Teton Irrigation ( 'anal 
Company et. al. ("Rexburg Decree") adjudication with a February 6, 1895. priority date 
and a purpose of use described as '·irrigation and other purposes ... The tvater right was 
reaffirmed in the Aberdeen-S)xinr:die!d Cano/ Company el. al. v. HemyEaglc 
adjudication ('"Eugle Decree'·) on March 12. 1969. Water right claim 01-297 is also a 
surface right diverted from the Snake River. The right is based on a prior decree with an 
.. irrigation" purpose of use. and the place of use is appurtenant to the same 61.722.6 
acres. The right authorizes the diversion of 230 cfs with an April 1. 1939. priority date. 
The combined quantity of ASCC's two surface rights is sufficient to inigate the entire 
6 L 722.6 acres. Holliday Aff. p. 3. 
Water right claims 35-4246 and 35-2543 are groundwater rights used in 
conj unction with the two surface rights Oil the same 61. 772.6 acre place of use. Both 
have an ··irrigation" purpose of use. Water right 35-4246 is based oil beneficial use for 
2.440 cfs \Vith an October 15. 1934. priority date. Water right 35-2543 was previously 
licensed for a quantity of 6 cfs with an August 7. 1958. priority date and with the source 
described as "groundwater:·2 In addition. ASCC operates four "recovery wells·· that 
pump directly into the canal system and are used to supplement the supply of water to 
shareholders located at the bottom third of the system when sho11falls occur. These wells 
2 The source is not described with any more pa11icu larity such as reclaimed water. reuse. wastewater. return 
flow. storage etc. nor does the license include any remarks more pa11icularly defining the source. 
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are not licensed and operate as recovery wells authorized pursuant to Idaho Code§ 42-
228.' 
Beginning in the J 950's and prior to November 19. 1987. individual ASCC 
shareholders drilled and licensed groundwater wells to supplement portions of the same 
61.722.6 acres to which ASCCs shares are appurtenant.4 The reason for drilling these 
supplemental wells was explained as follows: 
These claimants. who \Vere also Company shareholders over a long period 
of time prior to 1987. converted in part or in full their lands covered by 
Company shares to ground water irrigation ,;veils which were developed to 
supplement their surface rights delivered by the Company. This was 
accomplished by these claimants and shareholders to provide for irrigation 
efficiencies and/or because of difficulties experienced by the Company at 
times in delivering full supplies to their headgates due to their locations on 
the system. particularly at peak demand. 
2"d Howser Aff at 4. One hundred and twenty-six (126) of these wells were licensed. 
The licenses were issued in the name of the individual shareholders instead of in the 
nallle of ASCC Nothing in the record suggests that the source for the rights. as 
originally licensed. was anything other than groundwater or subterranean water. 
Moreover nothing in the record identifies the source as derived from the same source as 
ASCCs surface rights.~ 
Despite the application of groundwater by shareholders to all or part of the same 
acreage previously irrigated with ASCC water shares. ASCC made no corresponding 
' Idaho Code§ 42-228 exempts from the mandatory licensing process for establishing a water right through 
the drilling of wel Is and withdrawal of water "'for the sole purpose of recovering ground water resulting 
from irrigation under such irrigation works for further use on or drainage of lands to which the established 
water rights of the parties constructing the wel Is are appwienant ...... J.C. § 42-228. 
-i The record is not entirely clear as to the underlying basis for the \Vater rights (i.e. license. prior decree or 
beneficial use), however. ASCC states in briefing that .. all of the \veils of ASCC shareholders in 
Consolidated Subcase 35-23 I 5 were licensed with priority dates prior to 1987 as evidence by records of the 
Depa1tment." Claimanf 's Brief in Response lo Ohiecrur "s Brie/011 Challenge at 17. These groundwater 
rights are at issue in consolidated subcase 35-02315 which involves 126 similarly situated subcases where 
ASCC objected to the recommended source element. 
'The sources were not described with any more particularity such as reclaimed water, reuse, wastewater, 
return flow. storage etc .. nor do the licenses include any remarks more pa1iicularly defining the source. In 
fact. the 126 groundwater claims were recommended in the Direc/Ur 's Reporl with the source defined as 
··groundwater." ASCC filed objections to the 126 recommendations asserting that the source element 
should include a remark specifying that the source includes groundwater recovered from ASCCs surface 
irrigation works for use on land to which shares of ASCC are appwtenant and that the recovered water 
should be administered separately from all other rights in Basin 35 and the Snake River Basin. 
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reduction in the quantity of its surface diversion rights. including the 01 Bright nor 
it increase the number of irrigated acres of the place of use. Dreher p. 2. 
Approximately 67% of the surface water now diverted and channeled through ASCC's 
conveyance canals eventually seeps into the groundwater system. This 67% averages 
about 180.000 AF A. 211" Howser AfJ:. p. 5: Oleniclwk Afj:. p. 2 .. also State ofldczho Afj:. 
Ex. I (Dreher Aft:. p. 2) ( ·'a portion of the diversion provides incidental recharge to the 
Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer'"). The record does not reflect how much recharge seeped 
into the groundwater system prior to shareholders using groundv-,;ater. 
ASCC filed its original l'./otice o(Cluim for \Vater right 01-23B in the SRBA on 
May 8. 1990. claiming only ··irrigation'" as a purpose of use. The Director ·.1· Report for 
Irrigation and Other Uses. Reporting Arco 5 (/DWR Basin 35) was filed June 13. 1999, 
which included recommendations for the 126 groundv,1ater claims filed by ASCC's 
shareholders. The claims were recommended by IDWR with the source described as 
"groundwater." ASCC filed Ohiections to the Director·s recommendations for the 126 
claims on the that the recommendations should include a remark specifying that the 
source includes water recovered from ASCC's surface diversion works for use on land to 
\\hich shares of ASCC are appurtenant. The Ohjections also asse1ied that the recovered 
water should be administered separately from all other rights in Basin 35 and the Snake 
River Basin. 
On June 7. 2002. in resolution of ASCCs Ohiections. ASCC. IDWR and the 
State of Idaho entered into a 5.'ett!emenl Agreement agreeing that IDWR would 
recommend .. recharge for irrigation·· in the forthcoming Director's Report for Basin OJ 
as a purpose of use for ASCCs surface rights Ol-23B and 01-297 in addition to 
'·irrigation:' pursuant to the accomplished transfer provisions of Idaho Code§ 42-1425. 
Thompson AfJ:. Ex. E. The Settlement A:;:reement provided that: 
Existing ground water rights used for irrigation \".:ithin the service area of 
the Canal Company on lands paying assessments to the Canal Company 
and to which the Canal Company's surface rights have remained 
appurtenant will be given mitigation credit for the amount of water 
recharged against ground water depletions arising from the authorized 
diversion and use of ground water. 
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Id. at 4. The Settlement Agreement provided that once the SRBA Court issued partial 
decrees consistent with the Agreement ·s terms. ASCC would withdraw its objections. Id. 
at 5. The Settlement Agreemenr recognized that the recommendations '·will not 
automatically result in approval by the SRBA District Court of IDWR ·s recommendation 
for the Canal Company·s Basin O l rights:· Id On May 15. 2006. IDWR filed the 
Director ·s Report. Irrigation and Other Uses. !DWR Lower Basin OJ. recommending the 
additional purpose of use of"irrigation for recharge" with the following remark: 
"'Diversion of rights l-23B and 1-297 for the purpose of recharge for inigation is 
authorized for a maximum of 501.8 cfs / 2 L094 acres." On June 21. 2007. ASCC was 
granted leave to amend its claims in order to claim additional acres. Despite the 
Settlement Agreeme/1/ and IDWR's prior recommendation. ASCC claimed only 
"irrigation" as a purpose of use in the amended claims. On March 25. 2008. IDWR filed 
Amended Direc/or ·s Reports in response to the amended claims. which again included 
the "recharge for irrigationpurpose of use." Thereafter. the members of the S WC filed 
Objections, contesting priority dale,µurpose of use .. ptace of use and remarks. 
8. The Special '\faster did not err in applying Idaho Code § 42-1425 by 
recommending a purpose of use not previously recognized by a prior decree or by 
statute. 
The SWC argues the Special Master erred in applying the accomplished transfer 
provisions ofidaho Code § 42-1425 by recommending a ''recharge for irrigation" 
prnvose of use for water right claim 01-23B relating back to the original 1895 priority 
date when that specific pllll)OSe of use was not decreed in either the Rexburg Decree or 
the EaRle Decree. The SWC also argues the Special Master erred by recommending a 
··recharge for irrigation" pu1vose of use relating back to the original 1895 priority date 
vvhen groundwater recharge was not authorized by statute as a beneficial use until at least 
1978. This Court finds both arguments contrary to the express purpose of the 
accomplished transfer provisions of Idaho Code § 42-1425. 
t. The purpose of Idaho Code § 42-1425 is to effectuate a change to an 
element of a water right. 
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The accomplished transfer provisions of Idaho Code§ 
relevant part as follows: 
1425 provide in 
l) Legislative findings regarding accomplished transfers and the public 
interest. 
(a) The legislature finds and declares that prior to the commencement of 
the Snake River basin adjudication. and the northern Idaho adjudications. 
many persons entitled to the use of water or owning land to which water 
has been made appurtenant either by decree of the com1 or under 
provisions of the constitution and statutes of this state changed the place of 
use. point of diversion. nature or purpose of use. or period of use of their 
water rights without compliance ,vith the transfer provisions of sections 
42-108 and 42-222. Idaho Code. 
(b) The legislature finds that many of these changes occurred with the 
knowledge of other water users and that the water has been distributed to 
the right as changed. The legislature further finds and declares that the 
continuation of the historic water use patternscresulting from these changes 
is in the local public interest provided 110 otJ1er existing water right was 
injured at the time of the change. Denial ora claim ba·sed solely upon a 
failure to comply with sections 42-108 and 42-222. Idaho Code. where no 
injury or enlargement exists. would cause significant undue financial 
impact to a claimant and the local economy. Approval of the accomplished 
transfer through the procedure set forth in this section avoids the harsh 
economic impacts that would result from a denial of the claim. 
( c) The legislature further finds and declares that examination of these 
changes by the director through the procedures of section 42-222. Idaho 
Code. would be impractical and unduly burdensome. The more limited 
examination of these changes provided for in this section. constitutes a 
reasonable procedure for an expeditious reviev.i by the director while 
ensuring that the changes do not injure other existing water rights or 
constitute an enlargement of use of the original right. 
(2) Any change of place of use. point of diversion. nature or purpose of 
use or period of use of a water right by any person entitled to use of water 
or owning any land to which water has been made appurtenant either by 
decree of the court or under the provisions of the constitution and statutes 
of this state, prior to November 19. 1987. the date of commencement of 
the Snake River basin adjudication. and prior to January 1. 2006. for the 
northern Idaho adjudications authorized by section 42-l 406B. Idaho Code. 
may be claimed in the applicable general adjudication even though the 
person has not complied with sections 42-108 and 42-222. Idaho Code. 
provided no other water rights existing on the date of the change were 
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injured and the change did not result m an enlargement of the original 
right 
The arguments raised by the SWC ignore the purpose of the accomplished 
transfer statute. The express purpose of the accomplished transfer statute is as a 
substitute for the transfer provisions of Idaho Code§ 42-222. Idaho Code§ 42-1425 
authorizes a change to one or more elements of a water right and authorizes that the 
change retains the original priority date (as opposed to creating a ne\V right with a date of 
change priority) provided the change does not enlarge the use of the right or result in 
injury to other water rights. For purposes of Idaho Code § 42-1425, the previously 
unauthorized change must have occurred at a point in time prior to the commencement of 
the SRBA in 1987. 
The fact that a prior decree did not identify the claimed change is entirely 
predictable. The statute does not limit changes in water rights to those rights not 
previously decreed. The express purpose of the statute is to recognize d1~nges to water 
rights previously established "'by decree of the court or under provisions of the 
constitution and statutes of this state" and lo allow changed rights to maintain the original 
priority date. provided no existing rights are injured. The application of the statute 
cannot be construed as a collateral attack on a prior decree or license because the purpose 
of the statute is to authorize a change to a previously decreed or licensed element of the 
right. 6 The statute expressly authorizes changes to an element of the right different from 
that previously I icensed or decreed. 
(, In this case the prior decrees would not be conclusive as to the decreed purpose of use because the 
purpose of use for 1-23 B right was previously decreed as "irrigation and other purposes.'· The .. other 
purposes" language is common in older decrees. This Court has previously ruled that the use of the term 
.. other purposes" is vague and therefore allowed the claimant to present evidence regarding the use of the 
right at the time the decree was entered. See Me111rm111dum Decision lllld Order 011 Chllfle11ge; Order 
Granting State r~f'ldaho '.\' Motion for the Court to Ta/ie Judicial Notice r~f'Adill(/icatiPe Fllcts; Order Of 
Recommitmellf with Instructions to Special Master Cus/1111,111, Subcase Nos. 36-00003A l!f. al. (Nov. 23. 
1999). pp. 43-47. In that case. a claim for fish propagation was based on a p011ion of right decreed (Ne,r 
International Decree) in 1932 with the purpose of use described as irrigation, domestic and ··other 
purposes.'' The claimant was allowed to present evidence that the right was being used for fish propagation 
prior to the time the decree was entered. 
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Whether or not the use now being claimed was recognized as a beneficial use at 
the time the original right was established is not relevant to an accomplished transfer. 7 
For purposes of applying Idaho Code§ 42-1425. what is relevant is whether the 
accomplished change to the element of the v,ater right occurred prior to November 19. 
1987. The purpose of use need not be recognized as a beneficial use at the time the right 
was originally appropriated in order for the priority date to relate back. However, the use 
must be recognized as a beneficial use pursuant to state law at the time of the change. 
Therefore the key issue is whether a water right for groundwater recharge could be 
established without compliance with the ground,vater recharge statutes. 
2. A water right for groundwater recharge could be recognized as a 
beneficial use prior to the enactment of the recharge statutes provided there 
was an identifiable "beneficial use" to the appropriator. 
The SWC argues that groundwater recharge was not recognized as a beneficial 
use of water prior to 1978 when legislation declared groundwater recharge as a beneficial 
use. This Court agrees in part. and disagrees in part. The Court holds that prior to the 
legislative declaration of recharge as a beneficial use. water rights for recharge purposes 
could be established would depending on the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
particular use of the right. 
a. Legislative declaration that groundwater recharge is a beneficial use 
and authorization of groundwater recharge permits. 
In 1978. the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code § 42-234 recognizing ground 
water recharge as a beneficial use specifically in the vicinity of St. Anthony and Rexburg. 
The statute was enacted in conjunction with a groundwater recharge project. The statute 
authorized JDWR to issue a permit for the appropriation and underground storage of 
water for the purpose of recharging groundwater in furtherance of the pilot groundwater 
recharge project. 1978 Idaho Sess. Laws. ch. 366, p. 955 (codified as I.C. § 42-234). In 
1982. the Legislature enacted Idaho Code§ 42-4201A expanding the authorization of the 
beneficial use of groundwater recharge to aquifer recharge districts. 
7 The Cou1i also fails to see how it would be relevant in a transfer pursuant to Idaho Code§ 42-222 
provided the sought after change to the water right would not result in injury to existing users. 
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42-4201 A. RECHARGE OF GROUNDWATER BASINS -
DIRECTOR'S AUTHORITY TO ISSUE PERMIT- LIMITATIONS 
(2) ... [T]he legislature hereby declares that the appropriation and 
underground storage of water by an aquifer recharge district hereinafter 
created for purposes of groundwater recharge shall constitute a beneficial 
use and hereby authorizes the department of water resources to issue the 
aquifer recharge district a permit. pursuant to section 42-203, Idaho Code 
for the appropriation and underground storage of the unappropriated 
waters of the state. 
1982 ldaho Sess. Laws. ch. 204. pp. 538-539 (codified as I.C. § 42-4201A). The 
authorization. however. was not without limitation or regulation: 
(3) The director ... may regulate the amount of \:vater which the 
aquifer recharge district may appropriate and may reduce such amount. 
even though there is sufficient water to supply the entire amount originally 
authorized. 
(4) To insure that other water rights are not injured by the 
operations of the aquifer recharge district. the director of the department of 
water resources shall have the authority to approve. disapprove. or require 
alterations in the methods employed by the district to achieve groundwater 
recharge. In the event that the district [sic] (should read director) 
determines that the district"s methods of operation are adversely affecting 
existing \Vater rights or are creating conditions adverse to the beneficial 
use of water under existing rights. the director shall order the cessation of 
operations until such alterations as may be ordered by the director have 
been accomplished or such effects otherwise have been corrected. 
Id. at 539. In 1985. Idaho Code § 42-4201 A was amended to include groundwater 
recharge projects operated by irrigation districts in addition to aquifer recharge districts. 
1985 Idaho Sess. Laws. ch. 120. pp. 292-293. In 1994. Idaho Code§ 42-4201 A was 
amended to extend beyond water appropriations for proposed recharge projects to 
"'ce11ain water uses and proposed projects to recharge basins" as weil as to apply to "'any 
person, aquifer recharge district, irrigation district canal company or water district." 
subject to the same limitations and regulations. 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 274, pp. 851-
852. 
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In 1994. Idaho Code § 42-234 was also amended to expand recognition of 
groundwater recharge as a beneficial use beyond the vicinity St. Anthony and Rexburg 
to recharge projects in groundwater basins throughout the rest of the state. 1994 Idaho 
Sess. Laws. ch. 433. p. 1397. The following amendment was also included recognizing 
·'incidental'' recharge as being in the public interest but subject to the limitation that such 
recharge is not the basis for a new or expanded right: 
The legislature fu11her recogni::es that incidental ground water recharge 
benefits are often obtained from diversion and use of water for various 
beneficial purposes. However, such incidental recharge may not he used 
as the husis fhr duim of u separnte or expanded 1rnter right. Incidental 
recharge of aquifers which occurs as a result of \Vater diversion and use 
that does not exceed the \'ested water right of water right holders is in the 
public interest. The values of such mcidental recharge shall be considered 
in the management of the state· s resources. 
1994 Idaho Sess. Laws. ch. 433. p. 1397 (emphasis added). The impact of the 
amendment is recognition that there is a distinction in the law between the treatment of 
groundwater recharge that is purposeful. and recharg·e that is incidental as a result of a 
different beneficial use of water. 8 A plain reading of the amendment expressly prohibits 
the issuance of a separate \.\ater rigF1t or the expansion of an existing right for incidental 
recharge despite incidental recharge being in the public interest. 
In 2009, the legislature amended Idaho Code § 42-234 expanding the recognition 
of groundwater recharge as a beneficial use of water beyond recharge projects and 
incorporating the same limitations and regulations included in Idaho Code§ 42-4201 A. 
The legislature also repealed Idaho Code § 42-420 I A. 2009 Idaho Sess. Laws. ch. 241, 
p. 743. 
b. Beneficial uses of water are not limited to those expressly enumerated 
in the Idaho Constitution, authorized by statute or authorized by the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 
8 The term .. incidental" as commonly used in the context of water law means a use of water that is 
secondary to a primary use, For example. water in a ditch divened for the primary purpose of irrigation 
may be used for the incidental watering of I ivestock. Incidental recharge distinguishes that which incidental 
or unintended from that which is conducted for a specific purpose. 
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Idaho Code§ 104 provides that an appropriation water must be for "some 
useful or beneficial purpose" but does not define what constitutes a beneficial purpose. 
The issue of \,vhether beneficial uses for water rights are limited to those specifically 
enumerated in Article 15 § 3 of the Idaho Constitution9 and those expressly added by 
statute and/or affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Cou11 has already been addressed in the 
SRBA and remains law-of-the-case. In lvfemorundum Decision and Order on Cross-
Motionsfor Summary Judf{menr Re: Bureau of Rec!cmwtion Stream/low J\1ai11te11c111ce 
Claim. Subcase No. 63-03618 (Lucky Peak Reservoir) (Sept. 23. 2008) (''lucky Peak""). 
this Court upheld a claim for stream flow maintenance based on a license that did not 
comply with the Idaho Minimum Stream Flow Act. J.C.§ 42-1501 er. seq. ("Acf'). The 
license did not comply with l.C. § 42-1501 because it was not issued in the name of the 
Idaho Water Resource Board. At issue in Lucky Peak was whether IDWR exceeded its 
authority by issuing the license. This Court upheld the license reasoning that the Act 
constituted the first legislative declaration of in-strean:i flovvs being a beneficial use of 
water. However. this Cou11 emphasized that the Act was not the exclusive means by 
which such a right could be appropriated. Id. at 29-30. The Lucky Peak decision relied 
on State of Idaho. Dep 't of Parks 1·. Idaho Dep 't of TYater Adm in., 96 Idaho 440. 530 P.2d 
924 (1974) ("Malad Cunyon .. ). In that case. Justice Bakes in a special concurrence 
stated: '·I therefore conclude that the uses other than those enumerated in Article 15 § 3. 
can be beneficial uses:· Id. at 29 ( citing Malad ( 'cmyon at 44 7. 530 P .2d at 931 (Bakes 
special concurrence)). He also stated: 
With the exception of the uses implicitly declared to be beneficial by 
Article 15, § 3. there is always a possibility that other uses beneficial in 
one era will not be in another and rice rersa. As stated in Tulare Irrig. 
Dist. v. Lindsay-Srratmore !rrig. Dist .. 3 Cal. 2d 489. 45 P.2d 972, 1007 
(1935): 
What is a beneficial use. of course depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case. What may be a reasonable 
beneficial use. where water is present in excess of all needs. 
would not be a reasonable beneficial use in an area of great 
scarcity and great need. What is a beneficial use at one 
9 Article 15 ~ 3 of the Idaho Constitution recognizes the following purposes of use: domestic. agricultural. 
manufacturing, mining and milling connected with mining. 
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time may. because of changed conditions. become a ,vaste 
of water at a later time. 
Id. at 29. fn. 5. (quoting ltfolad Canyon at 448-49. 530 P.2d at 932-33 ). 
This Court reasoned that the Idaho Minimum Stream Flow Act waived the 
diversion requirement for establishing an in-stream flow water right. IJ. at 30. See also 
In Re: SRBA Case No 39576. Mh1idoku Nationol TFilJ!ife Refi1ge. Stole,'. U.S. 134 Idaho 
106. 996 P.2d 806 (2000) ("Smith Springs") (defining the Idaho Minimum Stream Flow 
Act as one of the two exceptions to the diversion the requirement. the other being stock-
watering). This Cou11 ruled that the facts in Lucky Peak pe11ained to releases of 
impounded water from a dam and therefore the Idaho Minimum Stream Flow Act I.C. § 
42-1501. did not apply. Id. at 19. 
Later this Court applied similar reasoning regarding claims for aesthetic. 
recreational and \x.rildlite or "ARW" water rights where a diversion is involved. Although 
the ARW Basin-Wide Issue was ultimately decided pursuant to an agreetnent of the 
pai1ies. the Corn1 nonetheless made factual findings and legal conclusions in support of 
entry of the decree. Consent Decree Re: Aesthetic, Recreation. and Wildlife (ARW) 
Purposes o/Cse. Basin-Wide Issue No. 00-91014 (Feb 20. '.2009). This Court held: 
Idaho Code ~ 42-104 provides that an appropriation must be for a 
beneficial purpose. However. the statute does not list or otherwise limit 
what constitutes a beneficial purpose. although there are other statutes 
which place limits on uses. such as for hydropower and minimum stream 
flows. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the beneficial purposes of 
use listed in Article 15 § 3 are not exhaustive. State Dept of Parks at 444. 
530 P.2d at 928. Against this background. it is reasonable (absent a 
provision of law to the contrary) to conclude that the list of what 
constitutes a beneficial use may be expanded via the administrative 
licensure process. The Director of IDWR is vested with the authority to 
review permit applications and approve licenses for new appropriations. 
This process provides other \'vater users the oppo1iunity to protest 
applications and seek judicial review. The process exists independently of 
any ongoing adjudication and will continue after the SRBA has concluded. 
Accordingly. it would seem that this is one manner in which the states 
develops a consensus on what constitutes a legally cognizable beneficial 
use. 
Id at 7-8. The legal conclusion was qualified as follows: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CHALLENGE 
S:\ORDERS•Coalilion Chalkngc - 1\hcrdeen \pnnglkld Canal c·u\tvkmorandum Dccisinn and Urdcrc.loc 
• 17 -
This particular conclusion of law is intended for the purpose of showing 
there is an arguable basis in law which supports the issuance of the 
consent decree, and shall not be interpreted as a ruling by this Court that 
IDWR. through the Licensure process. determines what constitutes 
beneficial use. The statement merely recognizes that there is a lengthy 
history of a significant number of licenses being issued for ARW 
purposes. whereby judicial review was not sought and/or subsequent 
legislative or administrative actions were not taken. 
Id. fn. 4. 
Based on the Malad Canyon reasoning and its subsequent application in 
the SRBA. what qualifies as a beneficial use is not limited to those purposes 
enumerated in the constitution. by statute or affirmed by the Idaho Supreme 
Corni. However. just because a particular use is now recognized as beneficial. 
does not mean that the use was always beneficial. Whether a particular use is 
beneficial depends on the particular facts and circumstances. 
c. A water right for groundwater recharge may be established through 
means other than the groundwater recharge statutes. 
Whether or not recharge qua! dies as a beneficial use. outside the groundwater 
recharge statutes. depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding the purpose and 
use of the recharge. Prior to enactment of the groundwater recharge statutes. some 
irrigators historically engaged in and relied on the purposeful and deliberate recharging of 
groundwater tables as a component of their historical irrigation practice. These practices 
included recharging groundwater early in the season when sufficient water was available 
for the purpose of raising water table levels to supplement surface irrigation later in the 
season when less water was available. as well as for re-diversion and use at a later time in 
lieu of unavailable storage water. In some areas of the state. irrigation may not have been 
practical with out the utilization of such recharge practices. Some of these uses of water 
have been approved by the Courts and the Department. See Budge Aff, Exhibit I (license 
issued in 1954 for soi! root zone storage with a! 949 priority); Exhibit 2 ( SRBA paiiia! 
decree issued for groundwater recharge with 1954 priority): Exhibit 3. pp. 36-37 (sub-
i1Tigation of lands recognized in the Rexhwx Decree). As early as 1951, the state 
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recognized the drilling Is, without a permit for a water right for recovering 
groundwater resulting from irrigation. The water ,Aas used on lands to wfoch established 
rights \Vere appurtenant. 1951 Idaho Sess. Lavvs Ch. p.151 codified as LC. § 42-
2.28. A claimant may therefore establish facts supporting a finding of a recharge purpose 
of use based on beneficial use without a specific legislative statute. Whether or not the 
particular use is determined to be beneficial would depend on the paiiicular facts and 
circumstances. This Comi therefore concludes that a water right for groundwater 
recharge may under certain circumstances be established independent of the groundwater 
recharge statutes. 
However. such a claim would require a shovving establishing a benefit to the 
appropriator derived from use of the recharge. Put differently, the claimant must 
demonstrate an identifiable useful or beneficial purpose to the appropriator for the 
recharge at the time of the appropriation. The claimant could not rely on subsequent 
legislation to establish that a benefit occurred to the public at large. Thus the mere 
assertion that the deliberate discharge of water into the aquifer or the incidental seepage 
of water into the aquifer is now deemed to be in the public interest is not enough. The 
claimant would need to show that a tangible purpose and benefit to the appropriator was 
derived from the recharge. If the claim is not based on the ··appropriator's" use of 
recharge, but relies entirely on a legislative declaration. the Court would conclude that 
the sole basis for the claim is the statute. Therefore the claim would be entirely subject 
to the statutory constraints and limitations. The circumstances that oecuned in both 
Lucky Peok and the ARW highlight this distinction. In Lucky Peok. the claimant went 
through the permit and license process specifying the reason and purpose of use for the 
appropriation. Similarly, the ARW rights were based on infomrntion about how the 
claimants were specifically using the water. A significant number of the ARW claims 
were based on licenses where the claimant previously sought an appropriation with 
IDWR for a particular ARW use. The beneficial uses were established independent of 
reliance on a legislative declaration. 
Groundwater recharge presents a unique set of circumstances because recharge 
can exist without the appropriator or anyone else actually making further use of or 
benefitting from the recharged groundwater. Suppose a claimant deliberately diverts 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CHALLENGE - 19 -
S:\( >RI )J"RS\Coaliuon Challenge - Aberdeen Spnnglidd Canal Cn\Memnrandum Decision and Order doc 
surface water into a :fissure in the ground without further purpose. use or re-use of the 
water. The groundwater table may be rising, but there is no identifiable use or need for 
the recharged groundwater. Present day legislation may well recognize that conduct as 
being in the public interest because it now results in a benefit to the public at large. 
However, absent legislative authorization. this practice would likely not be considered 
beneficial. 10 
A claim for storage illustrates another example. Storage of water may certainly 
be a beneficial use. However. storage for the mere sake of storage. without an 
identifiable accompanying use or purpose, would call into question whether the ··use" 
was beneficial. In such a case, the water is diverted and stored, but it is not put to use by 
the "appropriator." Similarly, recharging groundwater without an identifiable use or 
benefit to the appropriator fails to support a beneficial use in the absence of specific 
legislation. 
Incidental recharge resulting from an existing beneficial use provides another 
such example. In many cases. aquifer recharge is purely an incidental result associated 
with the beneficial use of an existing right. The law allows the original appropriator 
under the existing irrigation right to recapture and reuse that water provided the use is 
consistent with the existing water right and does not expand the use of the existing right. 
A & B Irr. Dist. r. Aherdeen-Americcm Foils Ground Water District. 141 Idaho 746. 752. 
118 P.3d 78. 84 (2005). Such use is considered a complement to the existing irrigation 
right as opposed to a new or additional use. In the event the appropriator does not 
recapture and reuse the water. the result is that the water seeps into and recharges the 
aquifer. The Legislature has also now recognized incidental recharge as being in the 
public interest. albeit subject to constraints and limitations. Prior to such legislation. the 
excess water recharging the aquifer may well have been viewed as a diversion of too 
much water for the purpose of use of the existing irrigation right. A & B Irr. Dist. at 752. 
118 P.3d at 84 ("'[s]hould A & B find itself in the unique situation of having more excess 
drain and/or waste water than it can reuse on its appropriated properties. Idaho law 
requires the district to diminish its diversion"). 
i<, The Idaho Legislature has now determined that groundwater recharge without further use by the 
appropriator is a beneficial use, but for reasons discussed elsewhere in this opinion, that authorization likely 
came about as a result of changes in conditions which did not previously exist. 
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It is erroneous to assume that a legislative declaration of beneficial use always 
acknowledges a use of water that was previously overlooked as beneficial and therefore 
can be used to retroactively justify a use previously considered wasteful. Such legislative 
declarations can result in response to conditions which did not previously exist. What is 
considered waste in one generation can become a beneficial use for a later generation 
based on changed conditions. Malad Canyon at 448-49. 530 P.2d at 932-33. In this 
instance, the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive state water plan, the full 
development of the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (ESPA), a better understanding of the 
ESPA. and the implementation of conjunctive management of ground and surface water 
all arguably constituted changed conditions giving rise to a change in policy on 
groundwater recharge. Prior to the existence of these conditions and statutes recharge 
may have constituted waste absent a showing that the water was actually being put to use 
by the appropriator. Prior to the development and use of groundwater. the diversion of 
surface water to the detriment of a subsequent downstream appropriator would have been 
viewed quite differently. 
In sum. this Court holds a claimant may establish a groundwater recharge right 
prior to the enactment of the recharge statutes. However. but such right requires a 
showing of beneficial use by the appropriator beyond mere reliance on a later legislative 
directive that the diversion is now considered a benefit to the public at large. If the 
statute is the sole justification for establishing beneficial use. then the claim is subject to 
the limitations and constraints of that legislation. 
C. Genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether ASCC changed 
its purpose of use to include "recharge for irrigation" prior to the commencement of 
the SRBA on November 19, 1987, or whether recharge was merely incidental to its 
irrigation practices. 
The SWC argues that the facts in the record are insufficient to support a finding 
that ASCC changed the purpose of use of the Ol-23B right to include '·recharge for 
irrigation·' prior to November 19, 1987. For the reasons discussed below. this Court finds 
genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether ASCC conducted purposeful 
recharge prior to November 19. 1987. in conjunction with its irrigation delivery practices, 
or was instead merely incidental recharge. The facts of record are insufficient to 
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distinguish between the two. The distinction is significant because ASCC relies on the 
provisions of the accomplished transfer statute as the support for its "recharge for 
irrigation" purpose of use claim. 
1. Genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether the 
recharge claimed by ASCC prior to November 19, 1987, was incidental to its 
operation. 
The issues in this case were decided on summary judgment. ASCC and the SWC 
each moved for summary judgment on separate issues. Accordingly. all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving 
party. Brown r. Cit)' of Pocatello. 148 Idaho 802. 806. 229 P.3d 1164. 1168 (2010). The 
burden of proving the absence of material facts is on the moving paiiy. Id. The party 
opposing summary judgment "must respond to the summary judgment with specific facts 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting Baxter v. Craney, )35 Idaho 166. 
170. 16 P.3d 263. 267 (2000)). ASCC moved for summary judgment assei:ting paiiial 
decrees should be entered according to the elements recommended in the Amended 
Director's Reports. ASCC filed affidavits in support of its Motion and relied on the 
primafacic weight accorded the Amended Director's Report. The SWC moved for 
summary judgment asserting as a matter of Jaw that ASCC s rights could not be decreed 
with a ··recharge for irrigation·· purpose of use with the priority date from two prior 
decrees that did not describe recharge as a purpose of use. 
ASCC asserted its irrigation practices included diverting a portion of the O 1-23B 
right for recharge in order to supply the groundwater source pumped by shareholders and 
applied to shareholder lands. However. the Court finds the facts to be inconclusive 
because conflicting inferences can be drawn from the facts. As noted previously. an 
appropriator is entitled to recapture and reapply Vv'ater under its existing right. For 
purposes of establishing recharge ASCC may have been able to re-apply the water 
through the use of recovery wells authorized pursuant to Idaho Code ~ 42-228. as it was 
already operating four such wells. Ifovvever. that is not what occurred with respect to the 
126 shareholder wells. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CHALLENGE . 22. 
S:IORD[RS1Coalition Cllallengc - Ahcrdeen Spring!idd Canal C0\Memorandu111 Decision and Order.doc 
purposes of applying the accomplished transfer statute. there has been no 
showing of an actual physical change the use of the O l-23B nght by ASCC. The 
.. change" that is alleged to have occmTed is that the diversion of the full quantity of the 
surface right allegedly continued after the issuance of the groundwater licenses to 
A SC Cs shareholders. The licenses were issued in the name of the shareholders instead 
of in the name of ASCC. Nothing in the record shows that the source for any of the 
rights. as originally licensed. was described as anything other than ground or 
subtenanean water. The source was not identified as being related to the same source as 
ASCCs surface rights. That is the reason ASCC objected to the recommendations. 
Although ASCC objected to the source recommendation for the individual licensed rights 
in the SRBA. the record is not clear as to \Vhether ASCC filed protests in the licensure 
proceedings on the same issue. The record does not show the issuance of the licenses 
was conditioned on ASCC continuing to divert the full quantity of its surface rights 
thereby acknmvledging that the source of the groundwater rights was supplied in part or 
· rn whole by ASCCs surface rights through re-diversion. For purposes of the licensure 
proceedings. existing water users were put on notice that the water pumped from the 
individual wells would assume a date of permit priority date as opposed to a re-diversion 
of a portion of ASCCs surface right with an earlier priority. The licenses have legal 
significance. 
ASCC now avers that it continued to divert the full quantity of the Ol-23B right 
after the wells were drilled. However. ASCC also states that "water is diverted only at 
times when the Company's shareholders need the water for beneficial use.'' Hmvser Aff, 
p. 2. Further, ··At all times prior to and after November 19. 1987. the Company has 
dive1ied and delivered to the Company's shareholders as needed water available up to the 
authorized maximum quantity available ... :· rJ Howser Aff. p. 4. At times a poliion 
of the surface right was placed in the Water Supply Bank as opposed to being used for 
recharge. 0/enciak Aff, p. 2. Therefore. one reasonable inference is that the water was 
managed to meet the demands of the shareholders irrigating with surface water and did 
not take into account depletions caused by groundwater pumping. When surface 
irrigators did not require water it was either not diverted or it was placed in the water 
bank. 
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ASCC does not specify exactly when the accomplished transfer from irrigation to 
recharge for irrigation is alleged to have occurred. Only that ·'At all times prior to and 
after November 19, 198T the Company delivered as needed up to the maximum quantity 
of LI 72.1 cfs for iJTigation purposes and 389.5 cfs for recharge for iJTigation. A prior 
decree does not bar the application of the accomplished transfer statute because the 
alleged transfer can take place after the decree was entered but prior to November 19, 
1987. However. a prior decree is nonetheless probative as to whether the recharge was 
purposeful or incidental to ASCC's operation. Shareholder wells were drilled as early as 
the 1950's. but ASCC did not seek to have any change in purpose of use identified in the 
Eagle Decree in l 969 after being put on notice that shareholder licenses did not identify 
the source as being a paii of ASCCs surface right. The wells were drilled between 1950 
and November 19. 1987. however. just because ASCC continued to deliver the shares 
instead of correspondingly reducing its surface diversions does not alone show the shares 
were diverted for recharge. An assumption that water was dive1ied for recharge is 
countered by common practices of carriage or head which is required to operate the 
delivery system. This is required whether or not all shareholders are dive11ing the surface 
water and applying it to their landsi In fact Idaho Code~ 42- 1201 requires that a water 
delivery entity keep its system charged. Thus one inference that can reasonably be drawn 
from the facts is that the claimed recharge resulting from the use of the O I -23B right is 
incidental recharge associated with ASCCs delivery practices. 
The Director's recommendation in this case was based on a negotiated settlement 
with ASCC. The State of Idaho filed the Afjzdarit of Karl J Dreher, then Director 
responsible for overseeing the preparation and submission of the recommendations to the 
Court. Director Dreher stated his basis for approving the settlement: '"! concluded that 
the accomplished transfer was justified because ASCC shareholders continue to pay 
assessments and ASCC diverted the ful I amount of water authorized under water right 
number 1-23B in most years. Thus a portion of the diversion prorided incidental 
recharge to the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer . ... The change from irrigation to recharge 
for iJTigation took place prior to November 19, 1987." Dreher Aff. p. 2 (emphasis 
added). It appears the Director's recommendation relied on the incidental recharge 
benefits associated with ASCCs delivery practices. ASCCs general manager 
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acknowledged in his affidavit that the diversion for recharge is derivative of ASCC's 
surface water irrigation diversions and is based on a formula developed by IDWR 
calculating recharge. Howser Afl. p. 2. ASCC does not offer any formula or 
methodology used to determine recharge benefits to its shareholders. nor does ASCC 
describe any efforts it undertook to facilitate recharge other than run water through its 
delivery system. There is no evidence of the implementation of a recharge program or 
project. 
These facts are not conclusive. These facts do not show whether ASCC was 
purposefully engaged in recharging the groundwater for use by its shareholders or 
whether the recharge was merely incidental to its overall delivery operation. In 
construing all inferences in favor of the non-moving pa11y. the Court finds there are 
genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether the recharge claimed by ASCC 
prior to November 19. 1987, was incidental. 
2. Incidental rechar:ge ~a!1not be used under the provisions of the 
accomplished transfer statute to expand the purpose of use of a water right. 
A determination that the claimed recharge is the result of incidental recharge is 
significant because incidental recharge cannot be used to expand an existing water right. 
ASCC's claim is not based on a beneficial use claim for recharge but rather on a transfer 
of an existing irrigation right to include the additional purpose of use of recharge for 
irrigation. The claim relies solely on the accornpl ished transfer provisions ofldaho Code 
§ 42-1425 because a formal transfer was not sought in accordance \vith Idaho Code§ 42-
222. The 1994 amendment to I.C. § 42-234 expressly prohibits the issuance of a separate 
water right or the expansion of an existing right based on incidental recharge. 
The legislature fm1her recognizes that incidental ground water recharge 
benefits are often obtained from diversion and use of water for various 
beneficial purposes. However. such incidental recharge may nor be used 
as the basis for claim of a separate or expanded water right. Incidental 
recharge of aquifers which occurs as a result of water diversion and use 
that does not exceed the vested water right of \Vater right holders is in the 
public interest. The values of such incidental recharge shall be considered 
in the management of the state's resources. 
1994 Idaho Sess. Laws. ch. 433. p. 1397 (emphasis added). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CHALLENGE 
S:10RDERS\Coali11011 Challenge - Aberdeen Springfield Canal Co\Mcmorandurn Decision and Order doc 
- 25 -
The statute went into effect April 7. 1994. and was therefore in force at the time 
the provisions of the accomplished transfer statue on which ASCC relies went into effect 
on April 12. 1994. See 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 455. p. 1478. Any claim based on the 
accomplished transfer provisions ofldaho Code § 42-1425 would be subject to the 
limitations and constraints imposed by Idaho Code § 42-234. As such, the accomplished 
transfer provisions of Idaho Code § 42-1425 cannot be used as the basis to expand an 
existing right based on incidental recharge. Accordingly. if ASCCs claim is determined 
to be based on incidental recharge then such a transfer would not be authorized by statute. 
The record is insufficient to determine whether the recharge was incidental. 
Accordingly, the case is therefore remanded to the Special Master for further 
development of a factual record su1Tounding the development of the recharge and a 
determination on the basis for the recharge. The Court notes the motions for summary 
judgment were filed after the discovery deadline had expired. and neither party had 
conducted any timely discovery. Because this case raises issues of first impression a 
more complete record is desirable. The issues in this"ci~1sf need to be decided on a more 
complete record. The Court therefore leaves it to the discretion of the Special Master to 
determine the scope and timing of additional limited discovery. 
D. The Specia] Master erred by refusing to remand water right OI-23B to 
IDWR under the particular circumstances of this case. 
For the reason discussed below this Court concludes that the Special Master erred 
by not remanding to lDWR. However. at the time tbe Special Master did not have the 
benefit of this Court's ruling regarding the scope and purpose of the remand. Under 
ordinary circumstances, the Special Master's refusal to remand would be appropriate 
since the request for remand occurred we! I after discovery and the period for filing 
dispositive motions had closed. The request was made approximately a month before 
trial. Ordinarily, such late timing of a remand request would properly result in a denial 
by the Special Master on the grounds that the remand would delay the trial. As explained 
below. the remand hearing is not the first examination of injury or enlargement conducted 
by IDWR. As is explained below. the purpose of the remand hearing is not to serve as a 
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process for IDWR's initial inquiry into ury or enlargement In this case. however, 
ce1iain procedural nuances require this Corni to allow the opportunity for a remand. 
I. The nature of the objection must relate to alleged injury or 
enlargement as a result of the accomplished transfer in order to trigger an 
automatic remand. 
The SWC argues Idaho Code § 42-1425 mandates a remand to IDWR whenever 
an objection is filed to a recommendation for place of use. point of diversion. nature or 
purpose of use or period of use that is based on an accomplished transfer. The surface 
water coalition argues a mere objection is the sole triggering requirement for the remand. 
This Court disagrees and holds that given the limited purpose of the hearing, the 
objection must relate to injury or enlargement to trigger the remand under Idaho Code§ 
42-1425. 
The statute provides in relevant part: 
Except for the consent requirements of section 42-108, IdaJ10 Cwle, all 
requirements of section 42-108 and section 42-222, Idaho Code. are 
hereby waived in accordance with the following procedures: 
(a) If an objection is filed to a recommendation for accomplished change 
of place of use. point of diversion. nature or purpose of use or period of 
use. the district 1.:ourt shed! remand the \Vater right to the director for 
fu11her hearing to determine whether the change injured a waler right 
existing 011 the dare of the change or constituted an enlargement of the 
original right. After a hearing. the director shall submit a supplemental 
report to the district corni setting forth his findings and conclusions. If the 
claimant or any person who filed an objection to the accomplished transfer 
is aggrieved by the director's determination. they may seek review before 
the district comi. If the change is disallowed. the claimant shall be entitled 
to resume use of the original water right. provided such resumption of use 
will not cause injury or can be mitigated to prevent injury to existing water 
rights. The unapproved change shall not be deemed a forfeiture or 
abandonment of the original water right. 
(b) This section is not applicable to any claim based upon an enlargement 
of use. 
LC.§ 42-1425 (emphasis added). 
The statute must be considered as a whole. Farher v. Idaho State Ins. Fund. 147 
Idaho 307. 311 (2009). The purpose of the remand is limited to a determination as to 
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"'whether the change injured a water right existing on the date olf he change or 
constituted an enlargement of rhe original rig hr." The statute thus provides for a hearing 
of limited scope. Clearly, unless the objection alleges that the claimed transfer results in 
injury or enlargement, there is no purpose for a remand. It follows that the statute limits 
the remand requirement to circumstances \:vhere the objection asserts that the 
accomplished transfer results in injury or enlargement as opposed to an objection on a 
basis other than injury or enlargement. A mere objection is not enough to trigger a 
remand. An objection to one of the elements may be for any number of reasons. An 
objection to the place of use could be based on an incorrect legal description or 
encroachment on the land of another. An objection to the purpose of use could be that 
the right is not being used in conjunction with the purpose as claimed. Such objections do 
not trigger a remand. One of the issues in this case is whether or not as a matter of law 
groundwater recharge right can be established outside the groundwater recharge statutes. 
The SRBA utilizes a simplified ·'check the box" notice pleading. See SRBA 
Aaii1inistrative Order l, Rules of Procedure ("AOJ''). Standard Form l Ol~jection. 
Therefore it may not be readily ascertainable from the face of the pleading whether it 
raises issues of injury or enlargement. In a recent subcase. the Special Master required 
that the party seeking a remand file a more definite statement ··as to the exact nature of 
the injury or enlargement alleged to have occurred. and also a statement as to how said 
injury arises from the change in point of diversion for these rights.'' .Memorandum 
Decision and Order on ~Motions for Summary Judgment: Order Requiring Pioneer to 
File a Statement Regarding lnjlll}' or Enlargement; Order Setting Status Conference. 
Subcase 63-00166A et. al. (Oct.22.2010). The Special Master required an additional 
statement regarding injury or enlargement: 
Pioneer asse1is that the procedures set fo11h in LC. § 42-1425 are to be 
automatically implemented by the SRBA District Court whenever an 
objection is filed to a water right recommendation that is based on an 
accomplished transfer. Pioneer·s argument overlooks that in these 
particular subcases the Court's file lacked sufficient information to 
detennine whether these subcases should be remanded to IDWR for a 
hearing pursuant to LC. ~ 42-1425 .... Pioneer·s objection does not 
specify the nature of its objection to the claimed point of diversion. 
Pioneer did not fill out the line on the objection form where it asks what 
Pioneer asse11[s] the point of diversion "Should be." In other words, the 
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objection filed by Pioneer gives no indication that the reason it is objecting 
to Franklin and Mason·s claimed point of diversion is injury or 
enlargement occasioned by an unauthorized change: as opposed to perhaps 
an allegation that the point of diversion was simply described in the wrong 
qua11er quarter. 
Under LC. § 42-1425. the purposes for which a water right claim is to be 
remanded to IDWR for further proceedings are very limited to determine 
-vvhether the change resulted in h1jury or en.largen1ent. Prior to Pioneer~s 
request for remand, the Court could not have simply guessed or 
presupposed that Pioneer was asserting that unauthorized change in point 
of diversion has resulted in injury or enlargement. 
Id. at 10-11. This Court concurs vvith the reasoning. The objections in this case are 
similarly vague as to injury or enlargement. More importantly, however, in an attempt to 
clarify the basis for the objections the SWC filed a No/ice o.fFilinR Initial Reasons 
Supporting Objections but did not identify injury or enlargement as a basis its objections 
nor did it request a remand for further inquiry by IDWR. Budge Aff: Exhibit C. The 
Special Master would not have known that injury or enlargement were even at issue. 
The S\VC argues that it is not incumbent on the party opposing the accomplished 
transfer to conduct extensive discovery to determine whether the claim for an 
accomplished transfer results in injury or enlargement but rather that is the responsibility 
ofIDWR to investigate both issues. The SWC argues therefore that the remand is 
automatic. The argument ignores that Idaho Code § 42-1425 requires that the Corn1 
remand if an objection is filed to a .. recommendulion ·· for a change in the place of use. 
point of diversion. purpose of use or period of use. ( emphasis added). The statute uses 
the term "recommendation .. as opposed to the term "claim:· 11 The distinction is 
significant. Where a "recommendation .. is filed. IDWR has conducted an independent 
review of the claim and recommended the elements based on that review. In contrast, 
the use of the term "claim·· implies no such independent review was conducted. This 
distinction is exemplified in the SRBA with respect to claims established under federal 
law and those based on state law. IDWR does not conduct an independent review of 
11 The original version of the statute used the term ··claim." The statute was amended in 2006 and replaced 
the term "claim" with the term "recommendation." 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws. ch. 222. p. 663. The 
amendment, however. did not change how !DWR repo1ted accomplished transfers but rather the change 
reflected the practice that was already in place. In this case the SWC filed its objections in 2008 after the 
amendment of the statute. 
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claims based on federal law. As such. no director·s report recommendation is prepared. 
The objection is then filed to the ""claim." LC.§ 42-141 !A (8). The claim can-ies no 
primafc1cie weight. LC. § 42-1411 A( 12). By comparison, objections to claims based on 
state law, where IDWR has conducted an independent review, are filed to the 
recommendation in the director's rep011. LC.§ 42-1412. Unlike a federal claim. the 
director's report carries primofacie weight. Idaho Code § 42-1425 acknowledges this 
distinction. The statute recognizes that when a claim is filed based on an accomplished 
transfer. IDWR reviews the claim to determine whether or not the transfer will result in 
injury to existing rights or an enlargement of the original right. The accomplished 
transfer may be recommended disallowed or may be allowed with such restrictions as to 
avoid injury to existing users. Simply put, a claim for an accomplished transfer is not 
"rubberstamped" by IDWR even before a third party files an objection. It follO\vs then 
that the purpose of the remand is not to provide IDWR with the first opportunity to 
examine injury or enlargement bf!cause lDWR has already examined the claim for injury 
or enlargement. The purpose of the-remand is for IDWR to examine the objection to 
injury or enlargement and to consider additional information relating to these assertions. 
In construing the statute as a whole. this Court considered the limited purpose of 
the remand hearing. and the fact that IDWR considers injury and enlargement prior to 
filing the Director·s Repo11. It is clear that the objection to the accomplished transfer 
must allege potential injury or enlargement as one of the bases for the objection otherwise 
the Com1 finds there would be no apparent basis for the Special Master to automatically 
remand the matter to IDWR for "further hearing." 12 The Special Master is not precluded 
however, from sua sponte remanding the matter for further inquiry on injury and 
enlargement, nor is a pai1y precluded from requesting remand for frn1her inquiry into 
these issues. 13 
1
" As a matter of course in the SRBA, the Special Master would not automatically remand to IDWR 
without first hearing from the parties on whether or not to remand. In many cases pai1ies prefer to address 
injury or enlargement in the proceedings before the Special Master or just request a supplemental director's 
report and the oppo11un ity to submit any additional information to I DWR. 
1
' However. as explained elsewhere in this opinion any such requests for remand should be timely made. 
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2. The "'further hearing" contemplated by I.C. § 42-1425 is not a 
separate formal administrative proceeding but rather the opportunity to submit 
information and/or argument to the Director that may have not been otherwise 
considered in preparing the Director's Report. 
a. The remand procedure contemplated by Idaho Code § 42-1425 is not 
a separate formal administrative proceeding under the Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
Idaho Code § 42-1425 sets forth a procedure for claiming a previously 
unauthorized transfer of the place of use. point of diversion. purpose of use or period of 
use, elements of a water right in lieu of following the formal administrative transfer 
requirements of Idaho Code § 42-222. The statute expressly acknowledges that 
"examination of these changes by the director through the procedures of section 42-222. 
would be impractical and unduly burdensome" and authorizes that the change ""be 
claimed in a general adjudication even though the person has not complied with sections 
42-108 and 42-222, Idaho Code.'' The statute pmifides tha.t following th(hearing, the 
director is to file a "supplemental repo1i.'' A suppkmer1t~frepoi( is a procedural 
component of a general adjudication. Idaho Code 42-1412 (4) provides: ·'Following 
expiration of the period for filing objections .... The court may request the director to 
conduct a further investigation and to submit a supplemental report for any water right 
acquired under state !av,· that is the subject of an objection.'' LC.§ 42-1412 (4). It is 
clear the procedures set fo1ih in Idaho Code § 42-1425 were not intended to require 
independent administrative proceedings. and do not trigger a separate right of review 
pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. Rather the procedures are intended to be 
integrated with the general adjudication. See Memorundum Decision and Order 011 
Challenge (City Of PocCl/ello). subcases 29-00271. et ct! .. p. 9 (Nov.9.2009) (holding 
application ofidaho Code§ 42-1425 should be read in the context of the rest of the 
SRBA adjudication processes). To conclude otherwise would vitiate the purpose of the 
process set forth in the statute by substituting one administrative proceeding for another. 
There are procedures in place for allowing administrative transfers to proceed 
concurrently with the adjudication; however Idaho Code§ 42-1425 does not provide one 
of them. See e.g. AOJ 17 b.(3). 
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b. The "further hearing" requirement is met where the objector has an 
opportunity to submit information on injury or enlargement. 
The statute requires remand to IDWR for '"further hearing'' but does not define the 
scope of the hearing. The language implies that one '·bearing" has already occuned. In 
the adjudication process the only "hearing'' that occurs prior to the deadline for filing 
objections, is the proceedure relating to the claims taking process and IDWR's 
investigation of the claims. During the investigative process, the claimant is afforded an 
opportunity to present information to be considered by IDWR in support of the claim. 
This opportunity is pa1ticularly important in the context of an accomplished transfer 
because IDWR may have no record of the change to the \Vater right. Ho"vever, no formal 
hearing is conducted as part of investigative process nor is the claimant at that point 
authorized to conduct formal discovery to present a case to IDWR in support of the 
claim. The culmination of the investigation results in the issuance of a director's repo1t. 
In most instances. IDWR obtains infom1ation from the claimant during this procedure. 
Prior to the filing of objections. IDWR may have limited information identifying 
objectors or the information they have to support allegations of injury or enlargement. 
The remand contemplated under Idaho Code § 42-1425 provides IDWR an opportunity to 
consider this infonnation in conjunction with its prior investigation. Thus use of the term 
"fu1ther hearing" implies a proceeding no broader in scope than originally occuITed at the 
investigative stage of the proceedings. Namely. parties are accorded the oppo1tunity to 
submit information and argument to IDWR regarding injury and enlargement. The 
culmination of the "'further hearing" results in the issuance of an amended or 
supplemental repo11 to the adjudication cou1i. 
Therefore, the Comt concludes that the scope of the remand hearing contemplated 
under Idaho Code § 42-1425 is no broader than that associated with the preparation of a 
director· s report or in the preparation of a supplemental director· s report. The parties 
have the opportunity to submit information and argument to TDWR regarding injury or 
enlargement. IDWR considers the information and argument and files an amended or 
supplemental repo1t with the Court and the case proceeds through the adjudication 
process. 
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c. The Special Master erred by refusing to remand to IDWR. 
The Special Master did not grant the SWC's request remand due to the late 
stage of the proceedings. The refusal for remand was based on the SW C's failure to 
show or even allege injury or enlargement in conjunction with its request. On August 8, 
2008, the SWC filed a Notice ofFiling Initial Reasons Supporting Objections but did not 
identify injury or enlargement as a basis for the objection. Budge Aff Exhibit C. The 
Special Master issued a scheduling order on September 2. 2008. The scheduling order set 
discovery cut off for March 6, 2009, the deadline for filing dispositive motions for March 
27, 2009, the pre-trial conference for May 21, 2009. and the trial to commence June 8, 
2009. On April 23, 2009, in a response brief to ASCC's motion for summary judgment 
the SWC alleged for the first time if the SW Cs motion for summary judgment was 
denied the matter must remand to IDWR for a hearing on injury or enlargement. The 
SWC did not allege how the accomplished transfer would result in injury or enlargement. 
The Special Master denied the request because he determined it would result in delay and 
because lDWR bad already considered injury and enlargement in the Amended Director's 
Report. 
Under ordinary circumstances, this Court would agree with the Special Master's 
reasoning that there would be no basis for remand. The remand request came well after 
discovery had closed and the trial date was a little over a month away. Granting the 
request at that point would have resulted in delayed the trial. The SWC had ample 
opportunity to request a remand prior to or during the discovery process. However, the 
recommendation in the Amended Director ·s Report in this case was based on a negotiated 
settlement between ASCC the State ofldaho and IDWR as opposed to an independent 
objective examination. This undermines the previously discussed reasoning for not 
automatically remanding to IDWR .. namely that IDWR has already investigated for injury 
or enlargement. Moreover, it gives primafucie weight IO a negotiated settlement entered 
into prior to the filing of a director's report and the opportunity for objections. 
The settlement agreement was reached in 2002. The settlement involves 
mitigation credits and implicates the conjunctive administration of ground and surface 
water. For all intents and purposes the Amended Director's Report based on the 
settlement was prepared in 2002. Fom1er Director Dreher concludes in his affidavit "the 
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accomplished change in purpose use from irrigation to recharge for a portion of 
ASCCs water rights did not injure other water rights or result in an enlargement because 
of the amount of water ASCC diverted and consumptively used." Dreher p. 2. 
Since 2002. as a result of the interim administration of water rights and the 
implementation of conjunctive management of ground and surface water. the 
understanding of what constitutes injury to an existing water right has evolved. This 
Court has ruled on what constitutes injury to other rights since that time. 14 Despite these 
developments. IDWR is in the awkward position of defending an old settlement instead 
of re-evaluating whether its terms would result in injury to existing users or enlargement. 
For these reasons the Court orders that on recornmitment to the Special Master. 
the matter be remanded to IDWR for a supplemental report if so requested by the parties. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the above stated reasons the matter is recommitted to the Special 
Master for further proceedings and the development of a record consistent with this 
opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED: A,..;:.J. Lt , 2 D \ 1 
- .... j 7 
. ,_.,/ f1r== 
ERJQ 1. W!LbMAN 
Presiding .Judge 
Snake River Basin Adjudication 
I-+ In Ci(r n/Pocatello this Court ruled that injury to an existing water right is not limited to the 
situation where immediate physical interference occurs between water rights on the date of the change but 
rather includes the diminished effects on existing priorities in times of administration. including the ability 
to pump out of priority in times of shortage. Id. at 14. 
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